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
THE THREE OR FOUR APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL REGULATION:
A CAUTIONARY ANALYSIS AGAINST EXUBERANCE IN CRISIS RESPONSE
Lawrence A. Cunningham* & David Zaring**
INTRODUCTION
 First the financial markets collapsed, and second came massive government intervention 
designed to address the collapse.  The third part of any financial crisis is reform.  Judging by the 
exuberant production of scores of ambitious alternative visions for financial regulation reform, 
one may expect unprecedented reform in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis.1  In considering what 
reform should look like, we caution that the headlong rush to do something should not neglect 
the surprisingly good things about the old system or ignore the considerable reform that has 
already been achieved by the federal government’s massive and unorthodox response to crisis.
Among the bewildering proliferation of alternatives, one, offered by Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson shortly after the failure of the first of many institutions in March 2008, boldly 
imagined a revolution in financial regulation.2  After it, other recommendations poured in, each 
with their own revolutionary visions of financial regulation reform, including two by an 
organization of financial industry notables led by Paul Volcker, the Group of Thirty.3 Other 
grand visions come from the Government Accountability Office,4 the Consumer Federation,5  the 
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
1 Some say that if this crisis “fails to do the trick, then there is little hope Washington will ever summon the will to 
reorganize its creaking, disjointed system of financial regulation.”  Now or Never for Financial Watchdogs Shake-
Up, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE49S6PD20081029.
Others say “we don’t have to start from scratch on regulatory reform of the financial services industry: There’s 
already a sensible blueprint for change.”  Editorial, A Starting Point for Regulatory Reform, MINN. STAR TRIB.
(Sept. 20, 2008), available at http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/28668184.html?page=2&c=y.     
2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
(March 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereinafter, TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT]. 
3 THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (Oct. 
2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_fsi_banking_G30%20Final%20Report%2010-3-
08.pdf [hereinafter VOLCKER I]; FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (Jan. 2009), 
available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/pub_1460.htm [hereinafter VOLCKER II]. 
4 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING 
PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM, GAO-09-216 (JAN. 2009), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf [hereinafter GAO FRAMEWORK].   
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Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee government interventions,6 plus a flurry of 
reports by Washington think tanks, dis- or semi-interested observers, and blue ribbon panels.7
Not to be overlooked is the functional reform that government’s extensive intervention 
created on the fly: reform, in essence, by deal, rather than by report.  There also continue to be 
good suggestions for reform of an incremental character, following the traditional US approach 
to financial reform in response to crisis.8
These various visions of regulatory reform, including those that follow traditional 
approaches, all stand a chance of enactment in the near term.  The Treasury Secretary and 
Federal Reserve Chair indicate desire for legislation and outline their own reform preferences, 
informed by the proliferation of reports.9  Congress debates proposals, poised to enact reform.  
And President Obama repeatedly calls for a new approach to financial regulation.10   

5 MARK COOPER & BARBARA ROPER, REFORM OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE COLLAPSE OF MARKET 
FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE FIRST STEPS TO REVITALIZE THE ECONOMY (2009), 
http://consumerfed.org/pdfs/FinancialMarketReformReport.pdf.   
6  CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009), http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf.
7 Noel Sacasa, Preventing Future Crises: Priorities for Regulatory Reform after the Meltdown, FINANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 2008, 11; Luigi Zingales, A New Regulatory Framework, CITY JOURNAL (March 31, 2009), 
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/eon0331lz.html; CHARLES CALOMIRIS, THE SUBPRIME TURMOIL: WHAT’S OLD,
WHAT’S NEW, AND WHAT’S NEXT (2008),  http://www.williams.edu/Economics/seminars/Calomiris_10_02_08.pdf.;
STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES, PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY REFORM (Investment Property Databank (IPD) Policy 
Brief, 2008), http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/Proposals%20for%20Regulatory%20Principles.pdf; COMM. ON CAP.
MARKETS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REORGANIZING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (Jan. 14, 2009) 
http://www.capmktsreg.org /pdfs/   CCMR%20-
%20Recommendations%20for%20Reorganizing%20the%20US%20Regulatory%20Structure.pdf; U.S. CHAMBER 
CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, REGULATORY REFORM PRINCIPLES (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.uschamber.com/assets/ccmc/081114ccmc_principles.pdf; INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE PROPOSAL FOR REGULATORY REFORM FOR THE U.S. MARKETS (2009), 
http://www.ise.com/assets/files/about_ise/ISE_Proposal_for_US_Financial_Market_Regulatory_Reform.pdf;
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM: DISCUSSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_reg_reform.pdf; NEW DEMOCRAT COALITION, NEW 
DEMOCRAT COALITION PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM (2009).   
http://www.financialreformwatch.com/uploads/file/New%20Democrat%20Principles%20for%20Financial%20Regu
latory%20Reform.pdf.   

8E.g., Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safe, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008) (proposing a federal 
Financial Product Safety Commission as a consolidated federal regulator akin to the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission); John C. Coffee Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?,
95 VA. L. REV. ___ (2009) (concentrating on the Securities and Exchange Commission). 

9   TREASURY OUTLINES FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY REFORM: PROVIDES NEW RULES OF THE ROAD, FOCUSES 
FIRST ON CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg72.html
10Damian Paletta, U.S. to Toughen Finance Rules, WALL ST. J. (March 16, 2009), A1; BARAK OBAMA, REMARKS 
BY THE PRESIDENT AFTER REGULATORY REFORM MEETING (Feb. 25, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-after-Regulatory-Reform-Meeting/.     

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Amid the hurly-burly, how shall rational choices among this avalanche of ideas be 
evaluated and made?  In this Article, we try to organize the choices for the perplexed.  Although 
in details the reform proposals can vary enormously, at bottom, they reflect, we think, a few stark 
choices.  There is, in short, a vital difference between the large number of regulatory reform 
proposals in circulation and the small number of functional regulatory reform choices actually 
available.  We think there are three or four options in approaching financial regulation.  They 
may be broken down into Democratic, Republican, old, and new—or, at least, events-driven—
alternatives, and each of these proposals has an exemplar.   
We generate a picture of what financial regulation is or should be using a comparative 
analysis of the old, pre-crisis regulatory system, often termed “creaky” or fragmented; the new 
reformed system that government intervention created, a kind of de facto quasi-centralization; 
and the proposals for planned reforms, especially Treasury’s blueprint, authored during a 
Republican administration, and its Democratic alternative, contained in the Group of Thirty 
reports.  Both of these latter planned (and grand) visions prescribe formal centralization of 
financial regulation, although, as we shall contend, for different reasons and with varying 
implications.  Of course, these solutions to our problems with financial oversight are more than 
just alternatives.  Each offers a vision of not just what can go wrong in our financial markets, but 
what is valuable about them, along with a theory of regulation that either embraces or suspects 
disinterested regulatory expertise and politically responsive governance. 
First, for example, the pre-existing system, although often castigated, has its merits and 
has long had its defenders.  It is a highly fragmented set of regulators, distributing authority 
between federal and state governments and across various agencies within both levels. The 
system was disorganized but battle-tested and built out of repeated reforms, in a patchwork effort 
not to repeat the mistakes of the last business cycle.  It brought, at its best, creative, competitive, 
and disaggregated oversight to the financial system.  The advantages of such a system have been 
praised by scholars for decades, including by Ralph Winter, Roberta Romano, Frank Easterbrook 
and others.11
It is not, however, the system we currently have.  A second approach to financial 
regulation and reform is the developed-on-the-fly approach adopted by Secretary Paulson and 
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke during the crisis of 2008.  This system developed from the 
old, disaggregated approach, yet looks like its own model of a reformed, and centralized, 
financial regulatory system.  It puts the Federal Reserve, with its matchless ability to intervene in 
the economy, at the fore of a financial regulatory system without many of the checks and 
balances that administrative law usually provides.    

11 E.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 251 (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); see also Henry N. 
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 1  (1990); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA.
L. REV. 961 (2001); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985).  
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The new crisis-driven approach amended the old system, not just in making the central 
bank particularly central, but in changing the organization of financial institutions, shutting down 
investment banks, and federalizing and nationalizing other firms. It shunted the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to the side, and created a de facto hierarchy of banking regulators (the 
Office of Thrift Supervision is at the bottom of that hierarchy, we expect).  The form of financial 
regulation that resulted is best described as ad hoc.  Still, the processes it has put in place, 
haphazardly, have adopted a centralized, unreviewable, emergency-based approach that has 
added to the regulatory arsenal market intervention, nationalization and, above all, deals.  It is 
not only a model for financial regulatory reform; it is the model we currently have. 
 A third approach appears in several widely-circulating reports addressing financial 
regulation reform, including Secretary Paulson’s blueprint released in March 2008.  These 
reports offer variations on a broad theme contemplating considerable consolidation of regulatory 
oversight in the US federal government.  The Treasury blueprint champions a version of the 
“two-peaked” model, centralizing in the federal government two broad categories of overseers, 
one focused on systemic stability and one on consumer and investor protection; in practice, 
Treasury has pursued this centralization during the financial crisis.12  These proposals rationalize 
and centralize authority to regulate markets—but then adopt a model of delegation to self-
regulation within the industry.  Because the Paulson blueprint was the first, most prominent, and 
most detailed variant of these approaches, we highlight it to analyze this approach to financial 
regulation.
 Surprisingly close variations on the consolidation theme appear in reports offered by 
others, including the Group of Thirty, headed by Paul Volcker, Chair of the Obama 
Administration’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board.  If Paulson’s blueprint represents the 
view of the Republican financial establishment, the Volcker reports give the view of its 
Democratic counterpart—Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, appointed by President Obama 
to succeed Paulson, is a member of Volcker’s group.  These visions are not entirely different, 
and in practice, both Republicans and Democrats have embraced the on-the-fly model of 
centralizing financial regulation in the Treasury and the Fed during the crisis.  Indeed, Secretary 
Geithner has done so explicitly, although he has adopted a consciously more transparent, 
restrictive and control-oriented approach than his predecessor, Secretary Paulson.13
 On the other hand, the Volcker group urges not only consolidation but prescribes more 
stringent, substantive, reform, establishing size limitations on financial institutions and other 
controls, such as limitations on proprietary securities trading by commercial banking 

12 Notably, much of what is articulated in architectural detail in the blueprint, and especially the centralization, was 
enacted on the fly by Secretary Paulson and the Federal Reserve Chairman during the 2008 crisis. 
13 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury, Fact Sheet, Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf (announcing continuation of government investment in 
financial institutions’ preferred stock but boasting of new transparency of approach and stating firm limits on any 
investee’s right to declare cash dividends on common stock, to use cash for acquisitions or to pay annual cash 
compensation to executive officers in excess of $500,000). 
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institutions.14  This sort of federalization follows a line of scholarship reaching from William 
Cary to Lucian Bebchuk.15
 Although the Paulson blueprint and Volcker reports both endorse consolidation of 
financial regulation in the federal government, ending the traditional American fragmentary 
system, they appear to do so for different reasons and with different visions for the 
consequences.  The blueprint promotes consolidation to enable U.S. capital markets and financial 
firms to compete globally, where other nations offer their own regulatory systems and all 
compete, in what is ultimately a competitive global stage.  In contrast, the Volcker proposals 
seek consolidation to stabilize and control American markets and firms and concurrently to join 
other national regulators in similar regulatory control to maintain an ordered global financial 
system.  The Volcker approach is internationally collaborative, while Paulson’s is internationally 
competitive.  Even so, the consolidated approach endorsed by both Paulson and Volcker has 
gained traction and an emerging consensus appears to extend regulation to new parts of the 
financial services industry, including hedge funds, possibly private equity, and over-the-counter 
derivatives.16
As we have suggested, we think that within these various approaches to financial 
regulation, three or four models can be discerned.  There is the decentralized old approach, the 
on-the-fly reforms in 2008 that have transformed it—not trivially—and the more considered 
centralized alternatives exemplified by Paulson’s Treasury Department and Volcker’s Group of 
Thirty.  They may stand in for other proposals that, we think, look like a reimagining of the 
architecture of financial regulation from institutionally similar, but distinctively Democratic and 
Republican, viewpoints.  More than two and less than five, these alternative visions of financial 
regulation are the approaches from which we will select our future system of finance.17
Which of these regulatory alternatives, then, should be preferred?  As scrutiny of the 
system of financial regulation reaches a new apogee, should we embrace the greener grass of 
organized reform, or stick with one of the (arguably) two systems we currently have?  If opting 
for planned centralization, is Paulson’s or Volcker’s grand vision to be preferred? 
This Article delineates these alternative approaches to financial regulation and provides a 
framework to assess them.  Some issues turn on questions well beyond law, including economic 

14 Steve Vogel, Report Faults Financial Overnight, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012201681.html. The  GAO  likewise 
encourages greater consolidation of regulatory authority in particular branches of the federal government and opine 
on characteristics that any refashioned US financial regulatory system should have.  See GAO FRAMEWORK, supra
note ___, at ___. 
15 E.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
16 The Treasury Secretary has testified before Congress on the need for “A Single Independent Regulator with 
responsibility over Systemically Important Firms and Critical Payment and Settlement  Systems.”  Supra note 9. 
17 Compare JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 (1938) (cautiously reflecting upon the several 
alternative approaches to financial regulation to diminish the frequency or magnitude of economic crises). 
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theory, political science and international relations.  Moreover, the alternatives confront a vast 
swath of the US regulatory bureaucracy, essentially all aspects of its financial markets and 
dozens of large regulatory organizations; the approaches bear considerable effects on the real 
economy and present literally hundreds of discrete, and important, issues for decision.  These 
complexities, and the prospect of both many proposals and potential revolutionary change, 
suggest the usefulness of having a framework for evaluation, which this Article provides.
Our most important normative conclusions are worth emphasizing at the outset.   First, as 
we have suggested, the pre-2008 crisis fragmented approach is a model in its own right, with 
characteristic benefits, yet undoubtedly accompanied by flaws.  Although debate about 
regulatory reform may incline to elide these benefits, they have a considerable academic 
pedigree that must be appreciated.   
Second, there has already been considerable financial regulation reform amid the 
government’s responses to the 2008 crisis.  It is not as obvious as many appear to believe that 
additional formal steps, and certainly not revolutionary, formal steps are appropriate.  If 
anything, it might be helpful to ratify the useful reformations to the system worked by the on-
the-fly regulatory response and eliminate or reverse less desirable ones.
Third, although the approaches exemplified by the Paulson and Volcker proposals both 
prescribe centralization to abandon fragmentation, they do so using different models, for 
different reasons and with different objectives—both federalize and centralize, but then one 
delegates to promote US global competitiveness whereas the other proposes to regulate, as 
apolitically as possible, and collaborate with international counterparts.   
Fourth, we think the fact that the principle regulatory reforms depend on a vision of 
globalization is prudent.  But we also believe that an approach that embraces the fact that both 
finance and regulators can cross borders is more sustainable than one that does not.  From both 
domestic and global perspectives, therefore, the grand visions may simply be impracticable and 
reliance on the traditions of ad hoc regulatory response all one should reasonably prescribe. 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I examines the prevailing models, 
introducing first the traditional fragmented regulatory structure and illustrating its relatively 
familiar method of responding to periodic crises on an ad hoc basis.  It then studies federal 
actions amid the 2008 crisis, which amounted both to ad hoc crisis response in the American 
tradition, as well as its own model of regulatory reform.  We also consider unusual aspects of the 
tools used in the 2008 crisis, highlighting its response-by-mega-deal, and exploring the oddity 
and utility of Treasury’s pre-crisis blueprint. 
Part II examines the Treasury’s blueprint and Volcker proposals, and illustrates their 
shared penchant for centralization of financial regulation.  Examination reveals the subtle but 
important differences in their motivations, the blueprint seeing globalization as a challenge to 
meet with regulatory competition and the Volcker proposals seeing globalization as a solution to 
regulatory limitations, worldwide, manifested in the 2008 crisis.  Paulson seeks centralization in 
order to promote US capital market competiveness, projecting the US into a regulatory 
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competition with other systems.  Volcker seeks centralization within the US, and coordination 
among other nations, to promote order in global financial markets.   
 Part III considers these three or four approaches to financial regulation, and relates them 
to the literature on administrative law and regulatory theory.  It discerns procedural and 
philosophical objectives of the Paulson and Volcker visions, the former vesting newly 
consolidated federal power in the executive for deregulatory and competitive ends, the latter in 
independent administrative agencies for re-regulatory and control-oriented ends.
 Ultimately, neither grand vision may be sustainable.  We may yet be left with remnants 
of the traditional US fragmented system, as concentrated by the on-the-fly reforms made during 
the 2008 crisis, with perhaps new regulations addressing certain financial instruments and 
institutions previously outside federal regulatory purview. We evaluate the merits of this 
approach as well, leading to our conclusion that incremental regulatory adjustments rather than 
sweeping regulatory revolution are both superior and more practicable. 
I.  PREVAILING APPROACHES: DYNAMIC EVOLUTION
 This Part examines the prevailing model of financial regulation through one or two 
variants: the pre-2008 crisis model and the quasi-concentrated alternative that replaced it amid 
federal government interventions in response to the crisis.  In doing so, it offers something of a 
history of financial regulation both before and during the crisis.  Section A reviews US financial 
regulation’s traditional fragmentary character and its redeployment to respond to past crises.  
Section B discusses the 2008 crisis and the response to it, showing both a kinship to previous ad 
hoc responses in genus, but not in species, and an unprecedented exercise of federal, mostly 
executive branch, power.   These are two related approaches to financial regulation.
 Section C continues the historical inquiry by connecting the traditional fragmentation and 
crisis response to the unusual nature of Treasury Secretary Paulson’s blueprint for regulatory 
reform which, given its timing and scope, may be seen as both anticipatory and preemptive.  It 
exemplifies a species of financial regulation which rationalizes in an effort to ensure domestic 
political control and international market competitiveness.  It was issued ahead of the crisis both 
to outline strategic and tactical responses to it and to lead and influence national reform 
discussions that its authors may have anticipated as they foresaw the coming crisis. 18

18 A thumbnail sketch of the 2008 crisis may begin with the increased personal savings rate in Asian countries, in the 
late 1990s, following stringent economic controls to correct the bursting of speculative asset bubbles there.  
Resulting cash found its way into the US mortgage finance system, which was already expanding. Expansion arose 
in part from low interest rates the Fed maintained to combat a recession threatened by the collapse of the US 
technology bubble in 2000 and terrorist attacks of late 2001. Existing mortgage finance institutions, including 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supported expansion by continuing to buy or guarantee mortgage loans.  Expansion 
was propelled by growing use of highly-rated mortgage-backed securities, pools of mortgages that pay interest and 
principal to investors, sold through investment banks.  
 These forces led lenders to offer attractive deals to large numbers of borrowers lacking traditional indicia of 
creditworthiness. Trillions of dollars of loans were made on easy terms, including loans not requiring a down 
payment and low or no interest payments for initial periods, subject to reset at higher rates later. Reinforcing 
expansion of easy credit were novel financial insurance products, called credit default swaps. These promised 
investors in mortgage-backed securities, and other debt, repayment by an insurer if their own debtor defaulted.  
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A. Traditional Fragmented Model and Ad Hoc Crisis Response 
Traditional financial regulation in the U.S. is best characterized as fragmented, and a 
fragmented approach is one model of financial regulation—indeed, it was the prevailing model 
until 2008.  Because the model has received a great deal of criticism, it is worth emphasizing its 
values, chiefly innovation and regulatory discipline by providing a range of alternatives.  The 
model featured a multiplicity of regulators, some of whom competed against one another, 
creating a market for law, and a crisis-driven evolutionary process.
 In the old model, for example, insurance law is primarily state law; banking law is a 
combination of state and federal law, depending on whether a bank is chartered by a state or at 
federal level; securities regulation is primarily, but not exclusively, federal; and futures 
regulation is entirely federal.  Various other intermediaries, including government-sponsored 
mortgage finance entities like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, fit awkwardly into the picture, and 
were subject to special federal regulatory oversight, while mortgage origination itself was left to 
state oversight. .  The same is true of credit unions.
 This fragmented system entailed roles for numerous actors, including state and federal 
law makers, regulators, supervisors and administrators.  In some fields, especially futures and to 
a lesser extent securities, important regulatory determinations were delegated to self-regulatory 
organizations, essentially industry groups charged with self-regulation.  It was difficult for any 
single authority to command knowledge of the entire financial system.  But if regulators found it 
difficult to evaluate systemic risk, the system, at least, knew what the regulators were up to. Most 
regulatory production and supervision was conducted in accordance with open government 
principles, meaning administrative law and procedure, such as notice and comment periods, 
subject to accountability tools such as those appearing in the Administrative Procedure Act (or 
state equivalents) and judicial review of legislative, executive and administrative action.19
 The traditional system, conceived as a model of financial regulation, looked almost 
irrational, but offered its share of advantages, such as a close fit between regulatory expertise and 
targeted industries, a degree of devolution that enables exercise of state authority and 
experimentation rather than monopolistic regulatory consolidation in Washington, and some 
competition among regulators themselves.20  Overall, the system’s characteristic open 
government promoted valued notions of democratic accountability and legitimacy.  Moreover, 

 The result was rising home prices that became a speculative bubble. The bubble began to deflate in 2004. 
Interest rates rose, sales slowed, lenders tightened standards and rating agencies identified greater risk in financial 
instruments supporting the expansion. Large numbers of people defaulted on mortgage loans when their outstanding 
balances exceeded a home’s market value.  Cascade effects ensued: prices fell, mortgage defaults rose, mortgage-
backed securities were impaired, capital contracted, and the effects rippled through all financial markets, eventually 
infecting the real economy, triggering a steep recession.  All these effects pulsed through the global financial 
system, sparing no national economy. 
19 See 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq. 
20 Indeed, some observers have characterized the system as a law market.  See LARRY RIBSTEIN & ERIN O’HARA,
THE LAW MARKET (2008). 
9

the various overlaps meant that regulators competed against one another for business.  To be 
sure, such a fragmented system resulted, at times, in both redundant and incomplete regulation.  
Under it, some institutions were subject to more than one layer of regulation while some 
transactions and institutions evaded regulation or oversight altogether.21
 Moreover, the structure posed challenges concerning addressing periodic financial crises 
that erupt.  Financial regulators certainly perform vital quotidian tasks, such as ensuring the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions, in addition to promoting fair treatment of 
customers and investors.  But they also must deal with occasional financial shocks. A fragmented 
structure may enable authorities to respond to discrete institutional failures using tailored tools; 
but it may also blind senior regulators to important systemic risks that lead to widespread crisis.  
The question becomes the net value of disaggregation, an industry-by-industry focus, and 
redundancy with gaps, or whether consolidation is likely to result in better regulatory 
performance in crises, as by reducing their magnitude or duration. 
 Other scholars, along with many white papers and books, have described precisely how 
this chaotic system works, and repeating their organizational charts and diagrams here would be 
unproductive.22  Instead, it may be useful to offer four examples of how this structure has been 
used to respond to, and at the same time how the structure has been changed by, past crises. 23
  Although the exact response differed in each case, a familiar American crisis response 
model of federal intervention appeared in each, along with the arguable failure of the system to 
evaluate systemic risk.  On the other hand, each crisis resulted from financial innovations that 
were not—to be sure—unambiguously useful, but that illustrate the remarkable number of 
market innovations over which the prior regime presided.  In addition, the examples show small-
scale versions of the kinds of crisis response tools that the Fed and Treasury deployed during the 
crisis of 2008. 
 Consider first the widespread failure of savings and loan institutions during the 1980s.24
In brief, these institutions heavily financed the purchase of individual properties, including many 
farms, at relatively high prices using relatively low interest rates.  After a real estate boom turned 
to bust, and property values fell while interest rates rose, borrowers defaulted in droves.  A 
downward spiral ensued.  All savings and loans were affected and several thousand became 
insolvent.   

21 We provide more elaborate assessment and implications in Part III. 
22 Readers wishing may consult GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note ___ or TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___. 
23 For a partial list, see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07bailout.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
24 For an account of the RTC process, see Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 221, 247 (2000). For a more general overview of the S&L crisis, see Edward L. Rubin, Communing 
with Disaster: What We Can Learn from the Jusen and the Savings and Loan Crises, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
79, 79 (1997) . 
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 The government responded with a serial federal takeover of all those institutions, at a cost 
of more than $100 billion, under the supervision of the Treasury in a Congressionally-created
special purpose authority called the Resolution Trust Corporation.25  It administered those 
institutions by selling off their assets over a period of years.  The response suggests a standard 
outline of using federal apparatus to resolve national problems that plagued thousands of state-
based or regional institutions that were largely not subject to federal oversight.   
 Similarly, the crisis led to reorganization of the S&L industry as well as abolishment of 
existing regulatory bodies and replacement with new ones.26  The government’s reform could be 
characterized as an industry reorganization: it turned thrifts into something that looked more like 
banks and gave a parallel makeover to the thrift regulator, which was renamed the Office of 
Thrift Supervision and placed within Treasury (it was formerly called the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board).27
  Consider second the stock market break of October 1987, when the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average dropped 22.6% on a single day and nearly 35% in the course of a month.   Capital 
markets shut down.  Panic was prevalent as the volume of corporate transactions, ranging from 
financings to mergers, fell.  Financial innovations, such as computer-triggered block sales of 
stock, and, again, regulatory gaps, were the story of the crisis.  President Reagan formed a 
working group to assess and advise on these matters.28   Here government’s reform was more 
measured and technical; it took reflective, post-crisis advice, and then adopted a number of 
“small ball” reform proposals.   
 President Reagan’s task force diagnosed causes, which it said were proliferation of new 
financial instruments, such as financial derivative contracts, program trading and portfolio 
insurance.29  Adopted reforms were pegged to specific stock market operations, like establishing 
circuit breakers to halt market trading if stated declines occurred.   Suggested reforms that were 
not adopted include some appearing in 2008’s Treasury blueprint and the 2009 Volcker report, 
such as reposing greater supervisory power over financial firms within the Fed and combining 
aspects of securities and futures regulation.30

25 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 
183 (1989). 
26 FIRREA abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and Bank Board and replaced them with 
the Resolution Trust Corporation and Office of Thrift Supervision.  Id. §§ 401, 501, 103 Stat. at 354, 364-94. 
27 See id. 
28 This President’s Working Group (PWG) is discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
29 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 29-42 (1988) [hereinafter BRADY REPORT].  
Critics extensively challenged these diagnoses, noting the international nature of the crash.  E.g., David D. Haddock, 
An Economic Analysis of the Brady Report: Public Interest, Special Interest, or Rent Extraction?, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 841 (1989). 
30 See BRADY REPORT, supra note ___, at 59 (Chapter Seven on Regulatory Implications: “One Market Mandates 
One Agency for Inter-market Issues”) & 61 (recommending possible merger of SEC and CFTC to promote joint 
responsibility); see also Michael D. Guttentag, Regulatory Rule #2: Insurance Products Need to be Regulated,
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 Third, consider the collapse of the large hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, in 
1997.  Again financial innovation played a role in causing the crisis, although this one featured 
the growth of an alternative asset class, rather than a liberalization of lending practices, or new 
computerized trading techniques.  Hedge funds were just beginning to reach the massive size 
they achieved by 2008.  And regulatory gaps appeared.  Neither the SEC nor CFTC oversaw the 
trades made by these funds.31
 LTCM essentially placed side bets on the direction of various financial benchmarks, such 
as currency exchanges and interest rates.  The firm used fairly sophisticated risk management 
tools and appears to have invested heavily in careful scrutiny of its positions.32  But due to a 
financial crisis that swept across Asia, both currency rates and interest rates moved sharply in 
directions LTCM had deemed highly improbable.  As a result, the firm was exposed to losses on 
hundreds of billions of dollars of trades.
 Counterparties grew hesitant to deal with the firm, and the result was a rapid descent into 
dire financial straits.  But LTCM had obligations to many other participants in the markets, and 
those participants had relied on those obligations.  Seen to represent a pivotal component of the 
financial system, the Fed, led by its New York office, orchestrated a takeover of LTCM by a 
consortium of financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs.   
 No systemic regulatory innovations were taken in the failure’s wake, however, despite 
increasing spread of financial derivatives and calls by some for enhanced oversight and 
regulation of them.33  However, the President’s Working Group, descendant of President 
Reagan’s post-1987 market crash task force, studied the crisis and resolved to strengthen 
cooperation among regulators in the future.34
 Although not a financial crisis, as such, the corporate accounting scandals of the early 
2000s and regulatory responses contribute perspective on the traditional fragmented system and 
pattern of crisis-response reform.  Four large enterprises, mostly in the technology sector, 
although one in the energy sector, used fiendish accounting shenanigans to create the illusion of 

http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/10/regulatory-ru-1.html (describing the role of portfolio insurance in the 1987 
stock market crash). 
31 For an account of the various proposals to regulate hedge funds by a current SEC commissioner, see Troy A. 
Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006). 
32 See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED (2002). 
33 E.g., Thomas A. Russo, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product 
Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431 (1991).  Noted investor Warren Buffett famously quipped that derivatives had 
become “financial weapons of mass destruction.”  See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & WARREN E. BUFFETT, THE 
ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 145 (2d ed. 2008). 
34 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
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billions of dollars of value.35  These and dozens of other corporations were discovered as all but 
(and in some cases total) frauds amid the collapse of the technology sector.
 Here too, financial innovations increasingly popular elsewhere.  Off-balance sheet special 
purpose investment vehicles and various forms of aggressive accounting for financial 
instruments appeared.  Gaps in the division between state and federal oversight, and relatively 
laissez-faire federal accounting oversight, were exploited.
 The swift federal response was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, reform targeted mostly 
at diagnosed causes of the frauds, plus a dozen remotely related provisions favored by various 
political interests.  The controversial legislation provoked criticism as an over-reaction to the 
perceived crisis of investor confidence.36  Although most of its provisions remain in effect, some 
implementing policies, especially concerning mandatory audits of corporate internal controls, 
were scaled back considerably.  Many observers cite Sarbanes-Oxley as illustrating the kind of 
dangerous over-reaction that crisis-driven legislative and regulatory reform can pose.
 These selected examples show some familiar traditional patterns of financial crisis and 
response in the fragmented model.   The crisis can bubble up in a particular sector—real estate 
bank lending in the S&L crisis, equity market pricing in 1987’s stock market break, derivative 
financial products in LTCM’s 1997 failure and technology in the early 2000’s accounting 
scandals.37  They also show a substantially coordinated national response, led at the federal level, 
usually based on ex post diagnostics of causes.  Finally, they show that regulatory responses are 
often tailored to the particulars of the problem, although many un-adopted proposals with greater 
systemic scope often are made.  In short, comprehensive reform of financial regulation has 
usually required a crisis to develop, but a crisis does not always lead to comprehensive 
regulatory reform. 
B. On-the-Fly Reform Model in 2008 Crisis: Ad Hoc Centralization  
 The 2008 crisis bears kinship to predecessors, in several ways, but its scale and scope 
were unprecedented.  One of us has elsewhere provided a detailed account of how the 
government responded to the crisis;38  here we consider its response as a model of regulatory 
reform.

35 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might 
Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev.  915 (2003). 
36 E.g., Roberta Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 
(2005). 
37 Federal intervention to address problems of one or a few firms that could pose systemic ripple effects recurs.  
Famous examples include addressing Penn Square bank, which threatened to topple Continental Illinois Bank, then 
7th largest in the US, see Phillip L. Zweig, Learning Old Lessons from a New Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at 
A19 (reviewing case in light of pending crisis at Enron Corporation), and Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), an illicit international web of financial operations whose collapse threatened the financial 
system’s stability, see United States v. BCCI Holdings, 69 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 1999). 
38 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis (draft 
Jan. 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1306342.    
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We posit the response as a reform model cautiously.  Nobody said they were reforming 
the financial system when they bailed out all those institutions, and it is easy to succumb to 
recency bias when evaluating the momentousness of legal developments.  Moreover, there are 
some ways that the crisis evolved according to the usual playbook.  But the response also 
centralized financial regulation, even if sub silentio, and so turned away from the old approach to 
financial regulation.
The response also dispensed with the usual trappings of administrative law in making 
what turned out to be the government’s signature policy initiative during 2008 into something 
done without notice, comment, judicial review, or, for much of its duration, authorizing 
legislation.  As we explain in what follows, the response changed the regulation of investment 
and commercial banking, mortgage finance, and even insurance regulation, and coordinated that 
change globally.  Yet, despite all of this action, it still left essentially unregulated the financial 
derivative instruments that some observers place at the root of the crisis. 
Is the regulatory response to the 2008 crisis its own model of financial regulation?  We 
are agnostic, and invite this Article’s readers to decide.  The following analysis should facilitate 
evaluation.
As with past crises, the 2008 crisis spread quickly. The S&L crisis and the 1987 stock 
market collapse exemplified the speed with which financial markets can turn from relatively safe 
to extraordinarily risky.  The 2008 crisis took on a momentum that accelerated rapidly, especially 
in the final quarter of that year.  As former Treasury Secretary Paulson wondered of the serial 
collapse of financial institutions during that period: “[w]ho are these guys that just keep 
coming?”39
 The 2008 crisis also followed the financial crisis rulebook in response, at least in the 
beginning.  The response began with firm-by-firm intervention in the spring, summer, and early 
fall of 2008,40 but ensuing efforts broadened to prevent asset prices from plunging.41 As with the 
S&L and LTCM crises, federal authorities used deals (M&A and corporate finance) to respond.42
But, again given the scale, ultimate responses reached unprecedented levels, amounting to 
regulatory intervention involving what is best described as regulation by deal.

39 See Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Struggling to Keep Up as the Crisis Raced On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2008, at A1. 
40 As discussed, infra, Bear Stearns in investment banking; Indy Mac, Washington Mutual and Wachovia in 
commercial banking, AIG in insurance; and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in mortgage finance.  
41 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.  This Act envisioned Treasury buying up to $750 billion in 
troubled assets using techniques such as reverse auctions to generate prices otherwise unformed amid distressed 
market conditions.  It was subsequently used as the basis for Treasury’s investment of $250 billion in preferred stock 
and warrants of banks.  See Steve Lohr, Bold Action With Basis in History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008). 
42 See Davidoff & Zaring, Big Deal, supra note ___.    
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 On balance, then, the government did something entirely new in responding to the 2008 
crisis, to the point of altering regulation of financial markets more generally.  It provided 
financial guarantees, bought preferred stock and warrants in private companies, extended 
commercial loans to others, acted as broker of numerous mergers and takeovers of yet others, 
took over some companies, in whole or in part, and made what amounted to business decisions to 
participate in some corporate finance and M&A activity with certain companies while allowing 
others simply to fail.43   The response paradigm was accordingly not unknown to the financial 
system, but is distinguished by ad hoc deal-making out of the crisis, rather than post hoc reform 
to calm troubled waters, as in previous crises.    
 The Fed and Treasury’s deal-making and injection of liquidity into capital markets forced 
both to resort to the novel use of legal authority to justify their actions.  And, given the scale of 
responses, it was never clear that either had that authority.44  They did seek and obtain legislation 
authorizing using up to $750 billion in Treasury funds to buy distressed assets and/or make 
investments in banks on behalf of the US government.45 But they also relied extensively on 
flexible Depression-era statutes to get involved in sectors of the economy in which they had 
previously never had purchase, dramatized by how the Fed bought an insurer—AIG—and 
Treasury became an insurer of money market funds.46
 As with other financial crises, this one and the response to it prompted proposals for 
large-scale, planned reform, including contributions made by groups and commentators ranging 
from the Group of Thirty to the GAO.47 Ironically, however, in this case, some of the reforms 
achieved by the Fed and Treasury were contemplated before the scale of crisis became clear, in 
March 2008’s Treasury blueprint.   For example, as we will detail, the blueprint counseled the 
centralized model which the Fed adopted, with assistance from Treasury, during 2008  It advised 
consolidating safety and soundness supervision in a single entity, and during the crisis, the Fed 
took over supervision of investment banks from the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The 
blueprint urged a federalization of insurance, and the Fed responded with a takeover of AIG.
This is a new order.  In our view, in the 2008 crisis, real, even lasting reforms to the 
financial system were actually generated on the fly, as the government responded, rather than 
after the response.  True, the various strands of the crisis led to different responses by different 
regulators.  But by the end of 2008, the federal government’s extensive financial commitment 
into nearly every financial services industry had substantially consolidated the various forms of 

43 See Charles Duhigg et al., As Crisis Grew, A Few Options Shrank to One, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2008). 
44 See Davidoff & Zaring, Big Deal, supra note ___.    
45 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.   
46 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.  On money market funds amid the crisis, see Mercer Bullard, 
Federally-Insured Money Market Funds and Narrow Banks: The Path of Least Insurance (March 2, 2009) (ssrn id. 
no. 1351987); on AIG, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout (March 10, 2009) (ssrn id no. 1346552). 
47 See supra text accompanying notes 2-5 (citing sources). 
15 

financial regulation.  It centralized regulatory authority in the Fed and Treasury, significantly 
reducing regulatory authority of other federal agencies and state regulators.
 Below we explore how the prevailing system of financial regulation shifted radically 
during the 2008 crisis and responses to it.  As we have said, the practice of investment banking 
was essentially terminated, moving remaining investment banks from supervision by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to supervision by the Fed.  The regulation of commercial 
banking was extensively consolidated within the federal government, especially within the Fed 
and Treasury.  Federal supervision of mortgage finance shifted from independent federal 
agencies to within the Fed and, especially, Treasury.  Even some aspects of insurance regulation 
shifted at least slightly from state to federal authorities.  It is all new, and it has transformed our 
formerly decentralized and fragmentary system into something quite different and novel. 
 1.  Investment Banking.  The 2008 crisis changed the face of investment banking 
completely, and arguably ended it as a separate sort of finance, in what amounts to de facto 
financial regulation reform.  The industry was led by five large firms:  Bear Stearns, Goldman 
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley.   Each of these firms during 2008 
essentially failed as stand-alone institutions, with the result that all five ceased to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and instead became subject to Fed 
oversight.
 Bear tripped first, in March 2008, after counterparties refused to offer short-term credit it 
needed to run its business.  In moves reminiscent of those applied to address the LTCM crisis in 
1997, the Fed and Treasury orchestrated a merger of Bear with JP Morgan Chase, a commercial 
bank, at an initial price per share of about $2—a price that holders promptly protested, getting it 
raised within two weeks to $10 per share.48
 In September 2008, an even worse fate befell Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, like 
Bear Stearns, heavily exposed to the subprime mortgage market.49   The Fed and Treasury 
elected not to sustain Lehman, though they helped to arrange for other financial institutions, like 
Barclay’s, a British commercial bank, to assume many of its operations.50

48 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bearn Stearns, Delaware 
and the Strategic Use of Comity (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1254648.
49 Evidence of its dire straits appeared in how Lehman was the only major defendant that refused to settle lawsuits 
challenging the suitability for individuals of auction rate securities. These were portrayed as liquid cash equivalents 
but their liquidity depended on investment banks willing to trade them, willingness that terminated amid the crisis 
and left individuals holding securities they could not sell.  See Gretchen Morgenson, As Good as Cash, Until It Is 
Not, N.Y. TIMES (March 9, 2008). 
50 The effort to enlist Barclay’s was important to protect investors under securities laws designed to secure customer 
funds held in brokerage accounts.  See SEC Press Release, Statement on Proposed Lehman Brothers, Inc. 
Acquisition by Barclays (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-206.htm.
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 During the same September week the Fed and Treasury signaled unwillingness to support 
Lehman, they sent the same signal to Merrill Lynch.51  As a result, Merrill quickly merged with 
Bank of America on the weekend that Lehman Brothers fell, in a deal likewise supported by the 
Fed and Treasury.  Within that week, moreover, also with the blessing of the Fed and Treasury, 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley opted to turn themselves into bank holding companies under Fed 
supervision and with expanded access to its liquidity facilities.52
 These changes were momentous, not only because they were achieved as a result of 
government decisions to provide or withhold support or to encourage or discourage particular 
transactions.   In many ways, it was these events, rather than the 1999 repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act, that marked the real end of 75 years of separation of investment banking from 
commercial banking in the United States.  That separation was begun with enactment of the 
Glass-Steagall Act, a Great Depression statute that established a legal wall that separated 
commercial from investment banking.  
 Under the Glass-Steagall Act—itself an ad hoc response to that period’s financial crisis—
commercial banks would take deposits and make loans; investment banks would buy and sell 
securities and engage in other transactional corporate finance.   Enterprises engaged in 
commercial banking could not engage in investment banking.  Most of that Act was repealed by 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, having gradually been chipped away with exemptions for 
commercial banks to underwrite securities and investment banks to own commercial bank 
subsidiaries.  The partial repeal ended the legal limitations on combining these activities within 
one firm.   
 Despite that repeal, there remained a large and recognizable group of firms that 
epitomized traditional investment banking—Bear, Goldman, Lehman, Merrill, and Morgan 
Stanley.   After repeal, and until the cataclysmic events of 2008, the SEC had jurisdiction over 
the safety and soundness of these firms, though its role in determining their fate would ultimately 
be minimal.  The SEC exercised its oversight through a voluntary program.53  The SEC 
Chairman who created and oversaw that program admitted in September 2008 that it was a total 
failure.54  With Lehman bankrupt, Bear and Merrill subsumed by commercial banking 
institutions and Goldman and Morgan Stanley officially commercial bank holding companies, 

51 See Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule Form 14A, at 49-50, Oct. 31, 2008, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/65100/000095012308014246/g15211mldefm14a.htm. See also
Jonathan Keehner & Bradley Keoun, Bank of America Said to Reach $44 Billion Deal to Buy Merrill, BLOOMBERG,
Sep. 14, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=alGoI3fTq1Us (quoting an 
analyst stating that “If Lehman fails, the next bank to be attacked would be Merrill. They are attempting to forestall 
that attack by linking with Bank of America.”). 
52 See Federal Reserve Board Press Release (Sept. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080921a.htm
53 The SEC’s inspector general analyzed the program amid the crisis, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf
54 See SEC Press Release, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm.
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the regulatory landscape was radically, although haphazardly, reformed, on the fly, by the Fed 
and Treasury.
 2. Commercial Banking.  Fed and Treasury activities during the 2008 crisis concerning 
commercial banking followed a more traditional model, although also on an unprecedented scale, 
and with the functional reform of concentrating regulatory authority in the Fed and Treasury.   
US commercial banking was traditionally a dual system, created at state and federal levels, 
although both subject to federal oversight.  Three institutional categories prevailed: national 
banks within the Federal Reserve system; national banks under supervision of the Comptroller of 
Currency within Treasury; and state-chartered banks, either within the Federal Reserve system or 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
 During the 2008 crisis, numerous commercial banks from within all three institutional 
categories faced extraordinary liquidity challenges.  Some became insolvent, failed and were 
taken over by federal authorities or sold to larger banks in deals orchestrated by federal 
authorities, especially the Fed and Treasury.  Principal examples are Indy Mac (put under FDIC 
supervision in July 2008),55 Washington Mutual (arranged sale to JP Morgan Chase in 
September 2008)56 and Wachovia (arranged sale to Wells Fargo in October 2008).57  The Fed 
and Treasury enlisted larger banks, including Bank of America, Barclays, Citicorp, JP Morgan 
Chase and Wells Fargo, to provide safer homes for these and other failing institutions.
 The Fed and Treasury also directly invested federal government funds in smaller and 
larger banks alike, not only relying upon traditional lending, but buying equity positions, and not 
only extending credit to commercial banks within their traditional purview, but to banks and 
non-banks outside their traditional jurisdiction.58  All of this was done quickly, on an emergency 
basis, and without the usual notice and comment that accompanies government rulemaking.  
Indeed, during Secretary Paulson’s tenure, this was often done without any pre-action notice at 
all and, despite a commitment to greater transparency, advance notice was not a feature of 
Secretary Geithner’s program either.59
 The Fed intervened in these events and transactions in two different ways: it provided 
financial support to some firms seeking liquidity and provided advice and support for others for 
whom merging operations was deemed superior.   Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act creates 
the liquidity mechanism, called the discount window, which had been used in the past to support 

55 See http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/IndyMac.html.
56 See Christopher Palmeri, JP Morgan to Buy Washington Mutual, BUS. WK. (Sept. 26, 2008). 
57 See Andrew Frye & Alison Veshkin, Wachovia Regulators Push Citicorp, Wells to Settle (Oct. 7, 2008), available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aZ2gXzQV2ndI&refer=home (noting that Wachovia 
initially agreed to merge with Citicorp but terminated that agreement in favor of superior deal with Wells Fargo, 
with federal regulators intervening to encourage a tripartite settlement of resulting dispute). 
58 See Jon Hilsenrath & Prabha Natarajan, Federal Reserve to Buy Commercial Paper, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES,
(Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://www.smartmoney.com/breaking-news/smw/?story=20081007094827.
59 See supra note ___. 
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troubled financial institutions, although not to the extent that it was used in 2008 to backstop 
credit in commercial banking more generally.  The relevant part of Section 13 provides:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by 
the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal Reserve bank, . . . to 
discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when 
… indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That 
before discounting . . . the Federal Reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, 
partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
banking institutions. ….60
 The Fed interpreted that Act to allow it to open its discount window not just to banks but 
other institutions in emergencies.61 These on-the-fly regulatory exertions did not overrule the 
system of dual banking in the United States, nor clearly reallocate authority within federal 
agencies, but they did put the Fed in a far stronger regulatory position than it had identified with 
historically.  As a rule of thumb in administrative law, if an agency has never done something in 
the past, it usually cannot do it, no matter how broad the grant of Depression era authority.62
But the dynamic paradigm of ad hoc centralization during 2008 allowed little time for quarrels 
over such legal niceties.
 3.  Mortgage Finance.  Treasury’s secondary mortgage market forays also seemed to 
recalibrate the government approach to home ownership support through the process of a 
government takeover.  By June 2008, it became clear that financial weakness plagued two of the 
most central participants in the US mortgage finance system,63 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.   
These government-sponsored entities (GSEs), created by Act of Congress but run as private 
firms, were widely but incorrectly perceived as enjoying government guarantees.64
 The GSEs were subject to oversight by a separate federal governmental authority but 
enjoyed no such explicit government guarantees.  Their principal business was buying or 
guaranteeing home mortgages and repackaging them into securities to generate ongoing funding 
to support the US housing market.  These activities resulted in them owning or guaranteeing 
more than half the multi-trillion dollars of outstanding US mortgage debt, including a large 
portion that would default or become delinquent in the 2008 crisis.
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60 12 U.S.C. § 343. 
61  The Fed also had invoked this authority when opening its discount window to investment banking institutions 
early in the 2008 crisis. 

62 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Bailout Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2008) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23sorkin.html?scp=1&sq=bailout%20administrative%20law&st=cse.
63 See Charles Duhigg et al., As Crisis Grew, A Few Options Shrank to One, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 8, 2008, at A1. 
64 The same was true for Ginnie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks; the same had been true for Sallie Mae until 
it transitioned fully into a private enterprise in the early 2000s.  See PAUL WEISS, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
RESCUE EFFORTS (Feb. 24, 2009) at p. 49.  For a prescient prescription that could have reduced the role that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac played in the 2008 crisis, see A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government 
Corporation, 1995 ILL. L. REV. 543. 

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 The steadily worsening weaknesses at Freddie and Fannie, however, induced Treasury to 
intervene.  It directed that they be put into a conservatorship.65  The intervention “stemmed from 
a growing realization by Fed and Treasury officials that the two companies could not survive in 
their existing forms, and that any collapse would be devastating to the economy.”66  The 
intervention depended on hastily passed supervisory authority that the Treasury, and Fannie and 
Freddie’s regulators, had promised Congress not to use.67  The Congressional authority, given on 
July 30, 2008, provided the following: 
The Director is authorized, . . . to make such determinations, take such actions, and perform such 
functions as the Director determines necessary regarding . . . decisions to appoint conservators for 
[Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae].68
 Treasury used the ability to make these sorts of purchase and sales when it assumed 
control over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae beginning in late summer 2008.   The conservator 
power was new, but bankruptcies, of course, happened under the old regime.  What differed was 
the origin of the conservator—a government agency closely supervised by Treasury, and with a 
long-term, rather than short-term, view.  The Congressional delegation of authority to Treasury 
to decide whether to seize the firms exemplified the centralization in 2008. 
  Fannie and Freddie had their own regulators who had little to do with the final 
disposition of the institutions.69 Treasury’s intervention in mortgage finance thus represents 
another part of the considerable financial regulation reform that occurred during the crisis of 
2008.
 4.  Insurance.  The on-the-fly centralization of 2008 even reached insurance. The day 
after Lehman was allowed to fail, the Fed and Treasury intervened to buy or backstop the assets 
of American International Group, a large insurance company that they had never regulated in the 
past.  AIG, subject to the jurisdiction of the New York State Insurance Department, ran sound 
insurance businesses through various divisions worldwide.  It also operated one division that 
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65 See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on Conservatorship, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp1128.pdf
66 See Deborah Solomon, Sudeep Reddy & Susanne Craig, Mounting Woes Left Officials with Little Room to 
Maneuver, WALL ST. J., available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122083060663308415.html?mod=hpp_us_pageone.
67 Treasury’s promise not to use its sought authority to rescue the Frannies was based on an assumption that market 
knowledge of the existence of Treasury’s power would increase market confidence in the viability of the two firms, 
thus obviating need to exercise the authority.  This hypothesis proved incorrect.  Notably, the same theory of market 
confidence appears in parts of the Treasury blueprint.   See infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
68 Pub. L. 110-289. 
69 The institutions also had plenty of skeptics, particularly of its forays into secondary mortgage finance, at the 
Federal Reserve (Alan Greenspan was particularly critical), in the Republican Party, and at Treasury itself.  Bethany 
McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 2009), available at 
www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/02/fannie-and-freddie200902.   
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underwrote a large volume of credit default swaps, essentially insurance against borrower default 
on debt.70    
 Amid the 2008 crisis of borrower defaults that spread through the financial system, AIG’s 
exposure on these reached staggering proportions that appeared to impair other parts of the 
company.71  AIG’s New York State insurance overseer proved unable to come up with the 
financing to backstop the company’s disastrous moves into credit default swaps and the 
mortgage market.72  But, in the Fed’s judgment, an AIG failure would threaten the financial 
system.  As a result, the Fed opened its discount window for AIG, initially to lend it $85 billion, 
with Treasury subsequently investing additional amounts in exchange for preferred stock that 
represented a controlling interest in the company.73
 The move was particularly notable because insurance law is primarily state law.  It is, in 
fact, quintessentially state law (and controversially so), as it is strongly insulated from federal 
oversight and influence.74  The 2008 crisis gave federal authorities reason and opportunity to 
revisit this arrangement.  And, again, the imposition of the central bank into insurance 
supervision was not only novel, such a trade of credit for equity was unprecedented in the Fed’s 
use of Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act.75 Furthermore, numerous insurance companies 
sought to convert themselves into savings and loan associations precisely to become subject to 
the Fed’s jurisdiction (in terms of both supervision and access to funds).76
Of course, this is not to say that such regulatory reform was comprehensive.  States retain 
plenary authority over the creation and regulation of insurance companies in the United States.  
Any efforts to alter that must await more planned and formal regulatory reform initiatives.  But, 
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70 Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/30/AR2008123003431.html.
71 In a scathing depiction of these operations, however, Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine refused motions to 
dismiss certain AIG directors in a shareholder derivative action in part on the grounds that the complaint’s allegation 
supported characterizing AIG as a “criminal organization.” In re AIG Consol. Deriv. Litig.,at 54 (Feb. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/uploads/file/int8B.PDF

72 WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2009);  Robert O’Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST,
December 31, 2008, available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/30/AR2008123003431.html.
73 See Monica Langley, et. al., Bad Bets and Cash Crunch Pushed Ailing AIG to Brink, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 
2008); Sjostrom, supra note ___, at 19-30; PAUL WEISS, A REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note ___, at 27. 
74 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015; see Barnett-Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance 
Regulation, 68 NYU L. REV. 13 (1993). 
75 See Press Release, Federal Reserve Board of New York, Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the 
JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 24, 2008) available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080324b.html; see also  Greg Ip, J.P. Morgan Buys 
Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis:  Central Bank Offers Loans To Brokers, Cuts Key Rate;  
Historic Steps, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2008). 
76 See PAUL WEISS, A REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note ___, at 2 & 12. 
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there is also no doubt that these steps represented at least some important substantive steps in a 
regulatory reform road.  

5.  Derivatives.  One important contributor to the 2008 crisis managed to evade the 
federal reform marked by the on-the-fly response to the crisis.  The derivative business over 
which financial institutions made their most disastrous risk calculations were credit default 
swaps.  AIG, for example, wrote a large book of business in the form of credit default swaps.  
What doomed AIG were defaults and coverage on these, not its traditional insurance operations.  
The credit default swaps it issued are like insurance contracts, which is presumably why AIG got 
into the business.  But the swaps are not like homeowner protection or D&O coverage.  For a 
fee, the insurer promises a lender to a third party that it would cover payments on the borrower’s 
default.   If larger than modeled defaults arise, as they did, this insurance program could wipe its 
underwriter out.  For AIG, it did.
 Credit default swaps, and many other modern financial products, evade tidy 
characterization within traditional classifications of financial devices.  They could be classified 
as insurance or securities or futures and therefore subject to state, SEC or CFTC regulation.  In 
fact, however, many of these devices were simply put beyond regulatory reach in the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000.77  Whether due to this statutory exemption or 
general problems of classification and jurisdiction, it became clear that trillions of dollars in 
notional amount of these products had been created without the kind of transparency, for markets 
or regulatory authorities, that usually accompany financial instrument creation, trading and 
settlement.78
 Many diagnoses of the 2008 crisis identified as a culprit the regulatory gap that allowed 
credit default swaps to evade supervision under insurance, securities and futures regulations.  But 
authorities in those fields abjured oversight.  Little that the Fed or Treasury did addressed these 
issues either, although the Fed’s intervention did guarantee a portion of AIG’s debt, providing at 
least some supervision.  In addition, by mid-February 2009, a bill was circulating in Congress to 
provide federal regulation of credit default swaps.79 This is in keeping with more traditional 
crisis-response practice.  Still, although complex derivatives appear to have been mis-valued by 
financial institutions, to their peril, none of the government regulators did anything about them in 
2008.
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77 CFMA largely put an array of financial derivative products outside the jurisdiction of either the SEC or CFTC.  
The blueprint provides a review of this legislation that seems generally favorable to it.  TREASURY BLUEPRINT,
supra note ___, at 46-48.   
78 The difficulty of classifying credit default swaps continued amid the crisis, with New York State considering 
treating them as insurance, the SEC expressing concern that they were not covered by its regulations and futures 
entrepreneurs floating proposals to develop organized futures trading markets for the instruments.   See WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 9, 2008) (reporting discussions of participants seeking to create a new organized trading platform for credit 
default swaps). 
79 Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 (sponsored by Representative Colin Peterson, 
Chair, House Agriculture Committee).   Other steps taken included efforts to establish an organized exchange 
market on which to trade credit default swaps.  See PAUL WEISS, A REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note ___ at 4 (noting 
SEC approval of LCH.Clearnet Ltd. to operate temporarily as a central clearing agency for credit default swaps). 
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 6.  Corporate Governance.  All this on-the-fly deal making even reached into areas of 
corporate governance traditionally governed by state corporation law.  For example, the AIG 
investments were accompanied by the AIG board’s contractual commitment that it would “work 
in good faith” with the investors “to ensure corporate governance arrangements satisfactory to 
the Trustees.”80  More generally, an eruption of public interest in executive compensation arose, 
leading regulators and Congress to impose limits on the compensation that investee companies 
were allowed to pay their senior executives.81
 7.  Global Reach.  As we will see, globalization is an important component of the more 
organized models of financial regulatory reform that we consider in the next Part.  It also played 
a part in the on-the-fly model.  The foregoing discussion of problems and responses in the US 
were replicated in dozens of other countries, including the United Kingdom, most European 
states, and many elsewhere around the world.  By October 2008, Iceland even teetered on 
national bankruptcy as a result; Denmark intervened by totally guaranteeing all inter-bank 
transactions for an initial two year period.  Global stock market indexes plunged, often in tandem 
with declines in the US Dow, which also occurred during the 1987 stock market break.    
 Justifications for US intervention in many cases, especially as to Bear and AIG, included 
threats to the global financial system, also an argument that supported the federal orchestration 
of the rescue of LTCM in 1997.  The ad hoc response to the crisis even had an official global 
component, as the principals from the G20 group of countries met to discuss the crisis in 
November, 2008.82 They released a statement of relatively low specificity, but one that 
nonetheless underscored the global character of the crisis: 
We pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and 
ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as 
appropriate to their circumstances. We will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies, 
consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of conduct. We will also make 
regulatory regimes more effective over the economic cycle, while ensuring that regulation is 
efficient, does not stifle innovation, and encourages expanded trade in financial products and 
services. We commit to transparent assessments of our national regulatory systems.83
 Given this statement’s relatively vague quality, perhaps it is notable for the signal it sent 
about the global nature of the crisis, rather than for specific regulatory reforms agreed to at the 

80 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012309004659/y75292exv10w1.htm.

81 See PAUL WEISS, A REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note ___ at 19 ff.  

82 Indeed, one way to think about international regulatory harmonization is as a three-stage process.  First, domestic 
regulators agree to share information with their foreign counterparts.  This doesn’t harmonize regulation, but solves 
some globalization problems (at least from the regulator’s perspective).  Second, the mechanism used for 
international information exchanges becomes the forum to generate principles of regulation commanding assent.  
These tend to be gauzy, short, and vague, and it isn’t clear that they amount to much.  Third, some of these 
institutions actually develop their own set of hard rules, as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision did with its 
capital adequacy accord.  See David Zaring, Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks, __ INT’L LAWY. __ 
(forthcoming 2009). 
83 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/summit-text.html?pagewanted=3.
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international level.84  Moreover, the ad hoc response to the 2008 crisis took on its most 
substantive global tint with various Fed efforts to coordinate monetary policy with its counterpart 
banks abroad.  And as future financial crisis will also draw on global trends, regulatory reform 
will likely be judged in part based on its global efficacy.85
__________
 Back on the domestic stage, in summary, the Fed and Treasury seized upon sweeping 
powers in response to the 2008 crisis.  A couple of these were explicitly created by Congress 
during the crisis, including legislation authorizing TARP and granting Treasury authority to seize 
GSE assets.  But, by and large, the agencies exercised authority in reliance on other, older 
statutes, in surprising novel ways, in exercises that amounted to the achievement of financial 
regulation reform.   
 Indeed, in addition to the powers referenced previously, the Fed and Treasury also 
extended their authority when expanding support into commercial paper market markets, money 
markets, asset-backed securities markets and even to bolster the financial stability of US 
automobile manufacturers.86  The Fed even let the financing arm of General Motors, GMAC, 
become a bank holding company, just as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had done, subject 
to Fed supervision and gaining access to the Fed’s liquidity facilities.  
The extent of all of this transactional activity, ranging across the financial spectrum, was 
certainly novel and, as an administrative law matter, quite creative.  There is some precedent, at 
least internationally, and to some degree in the LTCM case, for the Fed and Treasury’s active 
engagement in coordinating transactions between failed and sustainable institutions.87  But the 
2008 crisis—and the merger and investment scheme used to confront it—injected the Fed into 
industries it neither licensed nor in any other way regulated.
The 2008 crisis, in short, led to a “new model Fed,” one turned into something of a 
financial roving commission in search of safety and soundness, no matter what the industry.  It 
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84 To be fair, the action plan that follows the agreement on principles in some cases is a bit more substantive; the 
IMF gets a to-do list, and perhaps this looks like agreement on credit default swap regulation: “Supervisors and 
regulators, building on the imminent launch of central counterparty services for credit default swaps (CDS) in some 
countries, should: speed efforts to reduce the systemic risks of CDS and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
transactions; insist that market participants support exchange traded or electronic trading platforms for CDS 
contracts; expand OTC derivatives market transparency; and ensure that the infrastructure for OTC derivatives can 
support growing volumes.” Id. 
85 Our evaluation in Part II and especially Part III includes considerable attention to globalization. 

86 See Paul Weiss, A Reference Guide, supra note ___ at 44, 46,50; Robert Schmidt & Scott Lanman, Treasury, Fed 
Said to Unveil Plan to Bolster Consumer Financing, Bloomberg News (Nov. 25, 2008 ) available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aIXCu2ptpeCQ. The FDIC also created a novel 
liquidity guarantee program.  See Paul Weiss, A Reference Guide, supra note ___ at 38. 
87 In other countries, cajoling one bank to buy another one would be clearly within the purview of a central bank.  
David Zaring, How Does the Fed Have the Legal Authority to Bail out Bear?,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/03/how-does-the-fe.html.
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also placed the Treasury Department in an energetic and central role in crisis response.  The 
result is regulatory reform producing a vastly more centralized financial regulatory system than 
the United States has had, despite no formal dismantling of the infrastructure of the traditional 
fragmented model. 
C.  Anticipatory Preemptive Reform
 We think that history helps to explain the old model and the way it has been changed, sub
silentio, during the 2008 crisis.  Accordingly, we conclude our overview of the recent history of 
our system of financial regulation with a historical anomaly in the timing of one of the leading 
proposals for systemic reform.  In past financial crises, the tendency was for regulatory and 
policy analysts to study events after-the-fact, diagnose them and prescribe reform.  The studies 
ranged in scope and formality, from detailed exhumations to rough guesses, depending on 
exigencies.  But they were made in light of past events.   
 However, unlike in prior crises, Treasury had produced its blueprint for reform in March 
2008, before it became clear to the public that a crisis was at hand, and certainly before its 
severity was broadly understood.  Indeed, much of the blueprint was prepared, including 
predecessor study papers,88 amid comparatively calm market conditions, and released at the 
beginning of a crisis, rather than at the end of it.  Certainly, numerous post-crisis diagnoses and 
proposals have been made,89 in keeping with traditional US responses to crises, yet the 
blueprint’s early arrival remains a strikingly unusual feature of the 2008 crisis.
 The blueprint preceded the 2008 crisis, is not exactly proportional or even always related 
to it, and is more organized than is typical of responsive regulatory reform. As we have noted, 
scholars have found a common pattern of financial crises followed by financial reform and that 
pattern partly generated the fragmented model that prevailed up until the crisis of 2008.90  But 
with the blueprint, Secretary Paulson appeared to want to act ahead of the crisis, to prescribe 
radical change but relatively light regulation.  To that extent, the blueprint can be seen as seeking 
to preempt what its authors anticipated, rightly, would be calls for heavier regulation.91
 The blueprint is curious in another way.  Past reforms tended, overall, to be roughly 
proportional to precipitating events.  The stock market break of 1987 resulted in circuit breakers; 
the thrift crisis in creating new agencies to replace failed ones; the LTCM rescue simply 
generated increased attention to financial derivative products; and even Sarbanes-Oxley, despite 
criticism for being over-reaction, provided a number of specific reforms to address specific 
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88 E.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY 
MARKET (Dec. 5, 2006 & Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html.
89 See supra notes 2-5. 
90 See Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003); STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2003).
91 See Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, and Not Just of Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 
2008). 
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diagnosed weaknesses.  The blueprint, in contrast, imagined wholesale renovation of regulatory 
structures along lines that, when written, would have seemed disproportionate to any manifest 
urgency.
 True, on some subjects, the blueprint is consistent with the principle of proportionality.  
Indeed, in those instances there is an eerie sense that the blueprint anticipated substantially the 
kinds of powers that, amid the crisis, the Fed, Treasury and Congress, in rapid fire, embraced.  
These included how the Fed substantially expanded its use of the discount window to provide 
liquidity and brought within its oversight major investment banks; other examples are how 
Treasury obtained Congressional authorization for extraordinary funds to buy troubled assets, an 
authority it later interpreted to include buying equity stakes in financial institutions—a practice 
begun by Secretary Paulson in 2008 and continued by Secretary Geithner in 2009.
 Yet on other subjects, the blueprint may be less than proportional.  For example, some 
obvious culprits in the 2008 crisis are not expressly addressed, including the proliferation of 
unregulated credit default swaps.  Should they be regulated?  Many called for it during the 
burgeoning crisis, and Congress proposed applicable legislation.  But the blueprint has nothing to 
say about it.92  Other blueprint proposals address matters that had no diagnostic role in the crisis, 
such as merging the SEC and CFTC.    
 Implicit in these observations about the blueprint’s timing and content is a story about 
when regulatory reform is possible.  As Professors Ribstein and Banner have separately shown, 
comprehensive reform is not something for prosperous financial times.  It usually takes a crisis to 
generate the will for government innovation.93  Crises contribute heavily to a felt need for 
reform, which often means that crises are opportunities to enact a mixture of reform proposals 
that had accumulated for years, resulting in a kitchen sink model of reform (such as that 
appearing in parts of Sarbanes-Oxley).
 Notably, the Paulson blueprint does not display this characteristic.  Coherent and ordered, 
it is atypical for crisis-generated kitchen sink style regulatory reform.  Its arch-rival, contained in 
the Volcker reports, displays a mixture of the coherent vision with particular responses to the 
2008 crisis.  The next Part explores these competing visions for planned approaches to financial 
regulation.
II. ENVISIONED APPROACHES AND PLANNED STRUCTURES 
 The 2008 crisis certainly looks like a testimonial for the proposition that the fragmented, 
industry-by-industry, regulatory model is outdated and leaves regulatory gaps that must be 
closed.  Moreover, the haphazard character and uncertain success of the on-the-fly response to 
that crisis makes its own case for more planned out regulatory structures.  The Treasury 
blueprint, along with a variety of other approaches, embraces these viewpoints and radically re-
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92 The blueprint does seem to endorse aspects of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act that limited federal 
regulation of certain financial derivative instruments, supra note ___.   See BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 46-48. 
93 BANNER, supra note ___; Ribstein, supra note ___. 
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imagines unification across all financial sectors, to eliminate industry specificity and potentially 
to close gaps.94
 Unification the blueprint way means, ultimately, just a few senior regulators overseeing 
all financial markets and institutions—and those regulators would be politically accountable.  
Similar calls for concentration appear in proposals made by the Group of Thirty, though the 
senior regulators would have a rather different relationship with the political branches in those 
cases.  The centralization prescribed by both has been echoed by a number of the testimonials of 
high-ranking political officials about regulatory reform, including the Treasury Secretary.95
Because the blueprint and the Group of Thirty solutions represent the considered views of the 
Republican and Democratic establishments on financial regulation, the most important aspects of 
both warrant review, which this Part provides. 
A. Paulson’s Blueprint: Centralize, Delegate and Compete 
  The blueprint’s motivations were not the 2008 crisis that widened after its release—the  
blueprint was released, basically, before everything that happened in the crisis except for the 
collapse of Bear Stearns.  It is accordingly difficult to read the document as reflecting complete 
anticipation of them.  On the contrary, the blueprint says:  “while functioning well, the U.S. 
regulatory system is not optimal for promoting a competitive financial services sector leading the 
world and supporting continued economic innovation at home and abroad.”96
 The blueprint’s stated justifications for its proposals are the increasingly global capital 
markets, financial innovations such as through securitizations, and convergence among different 
kinds of financial institutions into large multi-line providers.97    In the widening crisis that 
followed, all these forces played a role, as Part I explored, but not exactly ones the blueprint 
suggests.  Globalization showed interlocking systemic dependencies, not threats to US 
competitiveness; securitization emerged as at least a partial cause of the problems, not a positive 
development that regulation should accommodate; and convergence of financial institutions was 
hastened during government orchestrated bailouts and mergers, along with substantial regulatory 
concentration in the Fed and Treasury.
 On the other hand, the blueprint rightly noted that the existing environment prevented any 
single governmental authority to command all necessary information concerning systemic 
financial risk.  It attributed this limitation to regulatory fragmentation, separating functions 
according to industry (banking, insurance, securities and futures).  It also presciently noted that 
market and/or regulatory failure in the financial sector could adversely affect the real economy.98
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94 For examples of other reform proposals that endorse the blueprint, see supra notes ___-___ and accompanying 
text. 
95 See supra note  ____ (citing http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg71.html).
96 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 1. 
97 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 3-4. 
98 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 4. 
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As discussed below, the blueprint imagines a radical, formal overhaul of US financial regulation, 
consisting of substantial federalization and unification, along with considerable delegation of 
regulatory authority to self-regulatory organizations in various financial services industries.  An 
important motivation is to promote US capital market competitiveness globally. 
 1.   Federalization.  The blueprint’s most significant suggestion for general regulatory 
authority over financial matters is formal expansion of Fed powers—pretty much those that the 
Fed exercised to address the 2008 crisis.  While the Fed used an ad hoc approach during the 
crisis, the blueprint welcomes the centralization that the new model Fed represents.   For 
example, during the crisis and for the first time since the Great Depression, in the interest of 
stabilizing markets, the Fed made loans to non-depository institutions through its discount 
window, the lending facility of last resort in the US.  Endorsing exactly these steps, the blueprint 
says this properly reflects the “fundamentally different nature of the [Fed’s] market stability 
function in today’s financial markets compared to those of the past.”99
 There is no doubt that this exercise of authority carried enormous systemic implications.  
The blueprint opines, however, that the kind of actions that the Fed would take during the crisis 
properly balanced promoting market stability with risks associated with extending federal 
support to investment banks (chiefly the risk that this will encourage imprudence, a risk called 
moral hazard).  It suggests formally authorizing the Fed to take these steps on a more regular 
basis, just as the Fed later did, although the blueprint emphasizes that doing so should be rare 
and subject to conditions, which is not exactly how the new model Fed proceeded (as our 
discussion in Part I suggested).
As noted, a presidential task force made similar recommendations in its report evaluating 
the stock market break of October 1987.100  The blueprint’s difference turns on the way this 
centralization is to be done.  The blueprint specifies the availability of the discount window—the 
loan-making power that the Fed relied upon to act in addressing failures at Bear Stearns and 
AIG—more clearly.  The blueprint provides for broad powers to open the discount window to 
any who need it, but suggests that the power to lend ought to be used both judiciously, and more 
generally than it has been used in the most recent emergency.  The idea is that a systemic 
regulator ought to act more systemically.101
 The blueprint would also vest considerable new and expansive authority in the 
President’s Working Group (PWG), the group created after the 1987 market break we discussed 
earlier.102  The group is, if it works, an indirect form of centralization of financial regulation, and 

99 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 7, 83. 
100 See BRADY REPORT, supra note ___, at ___; supra ___. 
101  Early in the widening 2008 crisis, Secretary Paulson called for aid to industry sectors, rather than struggling 
individual institutions, and for clearer up front rules on availability.  Generally, the blueprint approaches bailouts 
with skepticism, but the skepticism is related to individual businesses.  TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 
156. 
102 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___.  President Reagan created the PWG in Executive Order 12631 
(Mar. 18, 1988) 3 C.F.R. 559 (1989), Working Group on Financial Markets. 
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one without Congressional approval or oversight.  It brings the diverse federal regulatory 
agencies into a room heavily peopled with White House officials.  We view the blueprint’s 
intermediate recommendation of expanded PWG authority as an interim effort to begin its 
prescribed process of centralization in the executive in an administratively easy way.   
 The official PWG members are: (1) the Treasury Secretary (as Chair); (2) the Fed Chair; 
(3) the SEC Chair; (4) the CFTC Chair; and their respective staffs.   The executive order creating 
the group directed it to analyze the “major issues raised” by the 1987 market break, to determine 
“the actions, including governmental actions under existing laws and regulations (such as policy 
coordination and contingency planning),” that could forestall future such crises, provided that the 
group would pursue “private sector solutions wherever possible.”103
 Since receiving that charge, the PWG grew in size and scope, although it has never 
coordinated financial regulation in the way the blueprint would have it.  Its growth in size 
bespeaks both its importance as a matter of regulatory coordination and in setting financial 
policy.  Thus, since the 1990s, in addition to the permanent members, who are conventionally 
thought to be the premier financial regulators, policymakers such as the head of the President’s 
National Economic Council and the Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, 
began to attend the PWG’s meetings.  Similarly, other banking regulators joined the Fed at those 
meetings: the Comptroller of the Currency and the President of the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank “frequently attend” Working Group sessions.104
The group also evolved from undertaking ex post diagnoses of previous failures to a more 
proactive role in coordinating future regulation.  The group has considered how financial 
regulators can together promote investor confidence, track credit system issues (such as pursuing 
on-line clearing and same-day trade comparison for all equity and derivative products), develop 
effective market controls such as trading halts in emergencies and how to deal with large and 
rapid unwinding of positions.105
 The PWG has also considered how to more formally coordinate work—a chief goal 
tasked to the PWG under the blueprint.  This is not clearly a question of presidential 
aggrandizement.  Congress suggested in the early 1990s that the group could be used for 
“coordinating the activities of the agencies amidst increasingly integrated global financial 
markets.”106 The group has even been the source of some regulations.107 During the 2008 crisis, 
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103 Id.
104 Brett D. Fromson, Plunge Protection Team, WASH. POST (Feb. 23 1997). 
105 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATORY COORDINATION: THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUp (2000) 18-19. 
106 Id.  at 5. 
107 For example, in 1997, it suggested that the New York Stock Exchange change its circuit breaker rules from a 
point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average to a percentage decline in that index.  Those changes were made 
effective in 1998, when the group also proposed that Congress amend federal bankruptcy laws for financial 
institutions, and analyzed the LTCM hedge fund debacle in a report that discussed ways to limit excessive leverage 
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according to Paul Volcker’s Group of Thirty Report, the WPG “provided the backdrop for U.S. 
financial supervisors to respond quickly and decisively” by fostering “ongoing and fluid 
communication among regulators.”108
 The blueprint proposes expanding the PWG’s powers by turning it into the short-run 
locus of a consolidated financial regulatory approach through four steps:109  (1) broadening its 
focus “to include the entire financial sector, rather than solely financial markets,” (2) promoting 
consumer and investor protection, (3) expanding membership to formally include heads of the 
Office Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC and Office of Thrift Supervision and (4) authorizing 
the group to issue reports to the “President and others, as appropriate, through its role as the 
coordinator of financial regulatory policy.”110
 The point of this coordination is to put those with the disaggregated authority to shape 
and structure financial regulation in the same room.  In some ways, this amounts to nothing less 
than the creation of a unified financial regulator by executive fiat, foregoing the need for often 
delayed and difficult to control congressional input.  It is to implement the blueprint-light, while 
the executive branch awaits formal coordination promised by the actual blueprint to be 
promulgated by Congress. 
 Apart from this short-term expansion of Fed authority and PWG power, the blueprint 
introduces numerous new federal regulatory authorities.   The following highlights several of the 
more consequential new authorities that the blueprint envisions creating.  First, the blueprint 
proposes a Mortgage Origination Commission.  This would have a President-appointed Director 
of a 7-person board composed of designated agency heads.111  Federal legislation would create a 
uniform minimum licensing scheme for state mortgage market participants and the Mortgage 
Origination Commission would publish evaluative data on each state’s system implementing that 
legislation. The blueprint says that this will create incentives among states to provide strong 
oversight and set floors for mortgage originators.112
 Under the blueprint, insurance would no longer be exclusively a state matter but a federal 
matter because state regulation “makes the process of developing national products cumbersome 
and more costly, directly impacting the competitiveness of U.S. insurers.”113  Accordingly, the 
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and cultivate better risk management policies. President’s Working Group, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons 
of Long-Term Capital Management, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf.
108 VOLCKER I, supra note ___, at 49. 
109 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 5. 
110 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 6. 
111 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 6 & 80.  These are: the Federal Reserve, Office Comptroller of the 
Currency, FDIC, Office of Thrift Supervision, Credit Union Administration and Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors. 
112 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 7 & 80. 
113 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 9. 
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blueprint proposes to establish an optional federal charter (OFC) for insurers within the existing 
insurance regulation structure.114
 In addition, the blueprint proposes an Office of National Insurance within Treasury to 
regulate insurers using the new, optional federal charter for insurance.115  It is not obvious how 
Congressional oversight would work for this arrangement, although the blueprint notes that there 
was pending debate in Congress on the subject.116  Still, it also recommends creating an Office of 
Insurance Oversight within the Treasury Department.117 It would have authority to address 
international regulatory issues, including “authority to recognize international regulatory bodies 
for specific insurance purposes.”118  Similarly, the blueprint proposes a Federal Insurance 
Guarantee Fund.119 This would be run, in turn, by a Federal Insurance Guarantee Corporation, 
which would be a reconstituted version of the FDIC, handling not only deposit insurance but also 
insuring insurance products.120
 The blueprint also recommends that the “The direct federal supervision of state-chartered 
banks . . . be rationalized,” putting all such examination duties in the Fed or the FDIC.121   It 
would abolish the existing separate thrift charter in favor of a single national bank charter.122
This would entail closing the Office of Thrift Supervision and transferring its power to the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency.123  Finally, under the blueprint, payment and settlement 
systems that are systematically important would be federally chartered and subject to Fed 
oversight, with associated federal preemption.124
 In some ways, this grab bag of proposals offers some of the most striking the federal 
government has ever made.  They are a particular rebuke to proponents of state regulation of 
business, and mark both a centralization of power and an expansion of federal regulation.   States 
would lose a lot of their insurance regulatory authority.  The state bank counterparts to federal 
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115 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 10. 
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117 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 11. 
118 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 11. 
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123 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 8. 
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banks would also be eliminated—although it is by no means clear that state banks played any 
precipitating roles in the 2008 crisis.  And the mortgage and insurance regulatory powers that the 
federal government would take on are entirely new. 
 Nonetheless, this rationalization and centralization of regulatory authority would not 
happen without a role for states.  The availability of state regulations and state traditions are hard 
to break, as the way the blueprint’s proposed mortgage origination commission would be set up 
demonstrates.  That commission, after all, would cajole states and permit state regulation over 
and above federal minimum standards.  It is a curious exception to the general federalization of 
power represented by the blueprint, but perhaps the oversight of home mortgages is something 
that regulators outside of Fannie and Freddie simply cannot bring themselves to get involved 
with.
 Having proposed to expand executive branch power, and grow and consolidate federal 
power, the blueprint also proposes extensive delegation of much of this power to self-regulatory 
organizations (called SROs) in the various financial sectors being supervised.   It draws 
inspiration from extensive SRO use in futures regulation by the CFTC, urges expansion of SRO 
delegation by the SEC, and encourages other sectors either to create or expand such institutions 
too.  As one example, the blueprint proposes that Congress and the SEC converge broker-dealers 
with investment advisers to harmonize regulation of participants who are “offering similar 
services to retail investors.”125 It then proposes creating an SRO for investment advisers, pretty 
much along lines as presently exists for broker-dealers.126
 2.  Unification.  Beyond the foregoing short or intermediate term proposals, the blueprint 
offers more sweeping views of the future in what it denominates as “the optimal structure” of US 
financial regulation.  Long-term, the blueprint proposes broadening the Fed’s power (or power of 
something like it) even further, and creating two adjunct authorities, one to regulate financial 
aspects of institutions enjoying explicit government guarantees and one to regulate the business 
conduct of those and other financial institutions.  In addition, the blueprint presents with limited 
elaboration a corporate finance regulator, which would resemble the current SEC (after merging 
with the CFTC, as the blueprint also recommends). 
 The blueprint sets three regulatory objectives and envisions three senior regulators to 
achieve them: overall market stability by the Fed;127 financial supervision of firms with 
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125 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 14. 
126 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 13. 
127 The blueprint envisions the Fed continuing as at present except with broader jurisdiction. The Fed would 
continue as the central bank, setting monetary policy and serving as lender of last resort, among other traditional 
macroeconomic functions.  Its supervision would extend to all financial institutions, not just depository institutions. 
This expansion is said to reflect changes in financial markets, in which non-depository institutions play at least as 
vital a role as depository institutions once did.  In this vision, the blueprint emphasizes repeatedly that authority 
would be “broad, important and difficult to undertake.”  TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 148 & 152.  The 
Fed’s intervention powers would be “limited to instances threatening overall financial stability.”  Id. at 151.  The 
blueprint envisions two aspects of the Fed’s traditional lender of last resort function.  One would be regular discount 
window operations, along traditional lines.  A new one would be called a “market stability discount window.”   This 
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government guarantees by a prudential financial regulator using prevailing regulatory 
philosophies;128 and protective regulation for consumers of all financial firms by a new business 
conduct regulator.129  These are supplemented by two junior federal agencies charged with (a) 
administering the system of explicit government guarantees and (b) supervising public securities 
markets, presumably including futures markets, to encompass corporate disclosure, governance, 
accounting and auditing.130
 The blueprint arrives at its proposed optimal structure by eliminating alternatives:131 (1) 
institutionally-based functional regulation pretty much describes the pre-crisis fragmentary 
system, the chief weakness of which is that no single regulator has all information or 
coordination power; (2) pure functional regulation is based on activities, the chief weakness of 
which is trouble delineating activities that often overlap and assigning multiple regulators to 
individual firms; and (3) a single consolidated regulator for financial and consumer protection 
regulation, the chief drawback of which is it can limit synergies and reduce market innovation.  
The blueprint’s proposed optimal structure overcomes these weaknesses and its chief drawback, 
assuring communications between regulators, can be met, the theory goes. 
 The blueprint acknowledges that numerous issues are presented that it does not address, 
saying it only begins to identify main ones.132  Despite this reticence, the blueprint is clear in 
offering a summary of guidelines that would govern regulation throughout these agencies.  First, 
agencies would coordinate closely, perhaps with a coordinating body led by the Treasury 
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would be available on more flexible terms, as to types of loans and borrowers. The idea is that the flexibility could 
be more effective to address short-term liquidity needs than the traditional discount window alone. 
128 Prudential financial regulation refers to things like capital adequacy, activity limits and related supervision.  It is 
akin to regulation now applicable to depository institutions.  TREASURY BLUEPRINT, at 157.  This regulation is 
necessary to address moral hazard that arises from explicit government guarantees.  The blueprint imagines a new 
federal charter for all financial institutions enjoying explicit government guarantees.  Contending that the traditional 
US model of federal plus state banking regulation and experimentation is no longer useful, id. at 160, it recommends 
a new federal charter for all depository institutions to replace the fragmentary chartering system.  It draws the same 
conclusion for insurers, suggesting all become federally chartered.   All related guarantees, including for insurers, 
would be administered by a reconstituted Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The prudential financial 
regulator would oversee all such chartered firms.  
129 The business conduct regulator would have authority over all types of financial firms, not only those overseen by 
the prudential financial regulator, but also broker-dealers, hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, 
mutual funds, securities and futures firms and others.  Id. at 19.  All would be subject to identical national standards 
overseen by this single agency.  This regulator also would eventually oversee all financial markets, including 
securities and futures markets. Its primary function would address interactions between financial institutions and 
consumers and investors. Id. at 170.  Regulatory focus would be on information, disclosures and business practice 
standards.  It would include prohibitions against unfairness, deception and discrimination.   It would also include 
regulation of financial capacity and expertise.  It would not include power to prohibit products, limit entry, control 
prices or impose rigid licensing.  Id.
130 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 137-138. 
131 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 140-142. 
132 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 146. 
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Secretary.  Second, funding would be generated by fees imposed on regulated firms, not from 
general tax revenue.  Third, all regulation would be governed by stated general principles: 
“guidelines for regulatory process (e.g., public comment), analysis (e.g., cost-benefit analysis 
and alternative analysis), and review (e.g., monitoring compliance with the principles and reports 
to Congress).”133
B. Volcker’s Group of Thirty: Centralize, Control and Coordinate
If the blueprint and its ilk encourage reorganization centered in Treasury, and then, at 
least in content, delegated to private industry, is there any other way to rationalize the financial 
system without privatizing it?  We think that there may be a slightly different alternative 
available to policymakers, one developed by Democratic, rather than Republican, financial 
mandarins.  We caution, however, that it is not too different.
The blueprint’s optimal structure envisions three senior regulators of the financial system, 
although it is essentially a two-peaked model, in which the Fed and a prudential regulator 
probably rooted in Treasury are jointly responsible for systemic stability and a third senior 
agency is responsible for investor and consumer protection (this agency might also be situated 
within the Treasury Department).  The effort to remodel financial regulation into a “twin peaks” 
structure has some currency among financial policy experts, and is the remodeling achieved by 
Australia in the past decade.  Variations on it abound, including an even more concentrated 
model that features essentially one regulatory authority, as the United Kingdom’s Financial 
Services Authority. 
But the blueprint’s vision is not the only way to rationalize the system.  A similar sort of 
regulatory analysis might be called the Volcker approach.   Paul Volcker, a former Fed chair, and 
the inaugural Chair of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board in the Obama Administration, led 
a 2008 task force of public and private notables to opine on “The Structure of Financial 
Supervision”134 Shortly thereafter, in early 2009, the group issued its more prescriptive report 
called “Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability.”135
Although not nearly as detailed as Paulson’s blueprint, the Volcker proposals state 
relatively clear principles and offer many specific proposals.  The proposals show considerable 
affinity with the Treasury blueprint, along with some subtle yet important differences in 
philosophy, purpose and implementation methods.  It is a potential arch-rival to the Treasury 
blueprint for these reasons.  Indeed, the Volcker vision might be thought of as the insider 
alternative to the Paulson (himself an insider) approach.  The Volcker proposals also assume that 
status both because of Volcker’s role in the Obama Administration and because the drafting 
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133 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___, at 146. 
134 VOLCKER I, supra note ___.   
135 VOLCKER II, supra note ___.  Both reports were prepared under the auspices of the so-called “Group of Thirty,” 
an exclusive group of former and current regulators, including Andrew Crockett, formerly of the Basel Committee, 
Jacob Frenkel, a former board member of AIG, and former Fed Board members Roger Ferguson and E. Gerald 
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committee included Secretary Geithner, also an insider, having worked closely with Secretary 
Paulson as the President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank during the 2008 crisis.
It appears that in some ways insiders think alike, as both Volcker and Paulson in their 
reports express worry about globalization (albeit Volcker a bit more vigorously), exhibit an 
inclination to centralize and rationalize regulatory authority, and display a substantial amount of 
regard for central banks.  This overlap between the Volcker and Paulson approaches is either an 
indication of a reform consensus or a testament to the process by which Washington insiders 
quickly learn to see things in similar ways.   As we will explain, however, despite some 
important points of consonance, including promoting centralization, the two differ in vital, 
though perhaps subtle, ways.136
The 2008 Volcker report’s chief insight is to present a four-box menu of approaches to 
financial supervision that closely resembles the similar formulation appearing in Treasury’s 
blueprint.137  In the Volcker group’s view, the approaches include: institutional (where banks are 
supervised by one regulator and broker-dealers by another), functional (where the regulator is 
determined by the type of business being transacted—meaning that a bank like Bank of America 
would be responsible to banking regulators and, regarding its newly acquired broker dealer arm 
Merrill Lynch, to securities regulators); consolidated (where one regulator has responsibility 
over all financial institutions), and twin-peaks (where one regulator focuses on safety-and-
soundness, and the other on conduct of business).138  This menu list is a descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive, accomplishment. 
The 2008 Volcker report is like the Paulson blueprint in that it urges a rationalization of 
the US regulatory system, which it characterizes as “somewhat dated and complex”139 and the 
“exception” to the ordinary models for financial regulation prevalent elsewhere in the world.140
It essentially embraces consolidation on either a single-peaked model or twin-peaked model, as 
both “more rationally reflect the changes that have taken place in the financial services business 
over the past several years, and thus are widely viewed as more efficient and cost-effective by 
both regulators and regulated entities.”141
The 2008 Volcker report all but fetishizes this sort of concentration, including 
coordination “with the central bank,” securing the central bank’s “involvement in crisis 
management.”142  It particularly urges coordination by regulators with their international 
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136 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
137 We, of course, have our own views of the range of possibilities. 
138 Id. at 13. 
139 VOLCKER I, supra note ___, at 49. 
140 Id.  at 10. 
141 Id. at 50. 
142 Id. at 49-50. 
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counterparts over “systemically important global financial institutions.”143  It argues that 
financial reform in the US is not impossible, observing that “a majority” of jurisdictions “are in 
the process of further restructuring or are actively debating the need for significant changes to 
modernize their systems” in the past 15 years.144  The authors encourage the “trend toward the 
adoption of integrated regulators and towards regulation by objective.”145
Volcker’s second report, in early 2009, turns more prescriptive.  It states four core 
recommendations, all of which are highly re-regulatory, in contrast to the much more de-
regulatory framework that Treasury’s blueprint envisions.  These core points are to: (1) eliminate 
regulatory gaps; (2) tighten existing regulations; (3) strengthen existing governance; and (4) 
heighten market transparency. Within these, Volcker’s 2009 report continues to champion 
consolidation, using a one-peaked (“consolidated”) or perhaps two-peaked model, urging all 
countries, including the US, to use a single national authority for oversight of important banking 
institutions plus insurers, broker-dealers, money markets, private capital pools (including hedge 
funds and private equity firms) and government-sponsored entities (such as in mortgage finance).  
It also prescribes imposing restrictions on proprietary trading by large banks and limits on 
deposit concentrations. 
As for institutions themselves, the theme of the Volcker reports is promoting an 
important public-sector role in safeguarding financial stability, given the “inherent volatility of 
free financial markets, and the danger that volatility may occasionally reach crisis proportions 
threatening economic stability.”146  Accordingly, the future of financial regulation, in Volcker’s 
view, is in extending supervision over more of the financial system to governmental authorities.  
The 2009 report accordingly recommends extending federal supervision over non-bank financial 
institutions like insurance companies and investment banks (to the extent any may exist).   
The federal agency to be created under the 2009 Volcker proposal would also oversee 
money market mutual funds, reasoning that there are “dangers of institutions with no capital, no 
supervision, and no safety net operating as large pools of maturity transformation and liquidity 
risk.”147 The Volcker report would extend financial supervision over hedge funds, albeit 
somewhat modestly.  The report cites “need for greater transparency, a need for formal authority 
to register and track . . . funds, in terms of size, use of leverage, risk styles, and other important 
variables.”148  Certainly, this would require hedge funds to increase their disclosures about their 
positions to financial regulators.149  Nonetheless, the report also recommends subjecting hedge 
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funds to the possible discipline of formal regulatory authority to “reduce counterparty risk” (and 
so holds open the possibility of more elaborate command-and-control regulation). 
The only potentially deregulatory of the Volcker proposals involves getting the 
government out of the secondary mortgage market.   Institutions like Fannie and Freddie, which 
are both “profit-seeking private companies and agents of government policy, ha[ve] been shown 
to be unworkable over time and particularly in the midst of crises.”150  Despite that slight 
ratcheting down of government’s role in finance, enterprises engaged in mortgage lending 
activities would be subject to oversight of the new federal government regulatory apparatus.  
As for new financial products, the Volcker 2009 report concludes that it is “imperative 
that securitized and other structured product and derivative markets be held to regulatory 
disclosure and transparency standards at least comparable to those that have historically been 
applied to the public securities markets.”151  Concerning credit default swaps and other over-the-
counter derivatives, the report urges the establishment of a “central counterparty clearing 
arrangement for the credit derivatives market and coordinated efforts to greatly reduce the 
growth and size of outstanding contracts through bilateral compression agreements.”152   The 
goal is to reduce the size of these new markets, and to impose a “consistent regulatory 
framework on an international scale over the novel financial products,” in which “national 
regulators . . . share information and enter into appropriate cooperative arrangements with 
authorities of other countries responsible for overseeing activities.”153
As for the form of regulation, the Volcker report embraces an important role for the 
central bank in an extensively centralized regulatory edifice, which should “simplify and 
consolidate overly complex structures.”154  As for regulatory content, the report evinces a 
preference for principles over rules.155
Volcker’s 2009 report also urges particular substantive changes, on subjects not only of 
concern to traditional central banks and banking supervisors.  Certainly, the proposals call for 
enhancing capital requirements and ratios, and liquidity risk requirements, and assuring that a 
mechanism to resolve failing institutions exists.  The report also says that credit rating agencies 
should be compensated for risk analyses on a different payment model than they have used in the 
past.156  They urge improving fair value accounting and promoting the flexibility of accounting 
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standards generally.157  This includes a specific endorsement of mark to market accounting for 
“trading activities and most elements of market risk.”158  The Volcker 2009 report also ventures 
beyond any manifest elements of the 2008 crisis by recommending strengthening corporate 
board governance to improve risk management, executive compensation oversight, and auditing 
functions.159
The Volcker reports emphasize need for regulatory authorities to be independent.  
Although not specific, this may suggest that, within the US, the Volcker reports imagine the 
newly-consolidated regulatory power to be reposed in one or two independent federal agencies.  
This implication thus differs sharply from the blueprint’s prescription to put this power under the 
President’s control along with considerable delegation of authority to self-regulatory
organizations.
Above all, as with Volcker’s 2008 report, its 2009 recommendations strongly emphasize 
the need for international approaches—and, in particular, international coordination.  The 
Volcker reports embrace international cooperation as a solution to prudent oversight amid 
increasingly global financial markets.  For example, the reports suggest that “Prudential 
regulators in central banks should collaborate with international agencies in an effort to define 
leverage,” and ultimately limit it.  It admits concerns about capital adequacy, naturally enough, 
given that the largest institutions during the crisis appeared to be—much to their surprise—
substantially undercapitalized. 
 These views provide an interesting contrast between the Volcker report and Paulson’s 
Treasury blueprint.  While the Paulson blueprint pushed globalization as a reason for regulatory 
reform, the Volcker report characterizes it as part of the solution.  Volcker’s 2008 report pins 
high hopes for “colleges of supervisors”—that is, regulatory authorities from different 
jurisdictions who oversee the same multinational enterprise, and do so in a coordinated way.160
Indeed, “international groupings [such as the informal networks represented by the Basle 
Committee and IOSCO] . . .  need to be supplemented by colleges that facilitate communication 
between home and host supervisors in normal times so as to prepare the lines of communication 
for times of systemic crises.”161
 This focus on international coordination and control differs from the blueprint’s 
engagement with globalization, which seems more intended to promote US competiveness in 
global capital markets than a way to impose order on them.  Indeed, while both the Paulson and 
Volcker visions imagine substantial federalization and consolidation of regulatory power over 
wide ranging financial institutions, markets and products, they appear to do so for different 
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reasons.  These differences, and further contrasts with how both differ from the pre-existing 
structure and the developed-on-the-fly system forged by the 2008 crisis, entice the following 
framework for choosing among these three or four approaches to financial regulation.
III. CHOOSING AMONG APPROACHES
Our three or four models of financial regulation take different views on centralized versus 
decentralized government, the place of the executive branch in administrative law, and even the 
place of states and self-regulators in financial law.  In this Part, we evaluate the implications of 
each of these approaches on these areas.  In the end, while we understand the impetus for reform, 
we register a note of caution.  Centralization and rationalization along the Paulson and Volcker 
models seems sensible, and certainly has been practiced, to some degree, in 2008 and 2009.  But 
we think the unlovely older system had its advantages that should not be overlooked—
redundancy has its uses, and so does regulatory competition.   
As debate, Congress, and the executive branch turn away from the old way of doing 
things, we think that there is a serious risk that they may abandon some of the useful values of 
the old system.  We also think that there is more to the usefulness of the old system than appears 
to meet the current eye.  While if there must be reform, we lean towards the values of expertise, 
global cooperation, and the like embodied by the Volcker approach, we do not hew too closely to 
any of the centralization proposals—at least not if, ultimately, they put all the regulatory eggs in 
one putatively super-competent basket. 
The Treasury blueprint offers, as we have explained, an approach to regulation that turns 
first on a centralization of power, and second on a delegation of that power to industry.  The 
centralization would manifest itself in two ways; it flows to the federal government, and away 
from the states, and, within the federal government, to the Treasury Department and the 
President, and away from independent agencies like the SEC and, at least partly, even the Fed.  
Maximal delegation to self-regulatory organizations would follow.  An important goal seems to 
be to promote US international capital market competitiveness.   
The Volcker approach, although offering less detail or prescription, likewise envisions a 
planned, centralized and substantially unified approach to regulatory reform and resulting 
regulatory structures.  But both Volcker reports seem to vest resulting federal authority in 
independent agencies, not in the executive branch under the President’s control, and are 
motivated more by a desire to establish international regulatory control over global capital 
markets rather than to encourage or promote competition across national markets.  
These paired proposals, then, although in very different ways, both would radically alter 
the indisputably creaky current approach.  The current system relies on an incongruous blend of 
state supervision in some cases, while in others it depends on federal supervision divided by 
specific industry, and sometimes by various issue areas within an industry—say, local banks 
regulated by states, national banks regulated by the Fed and Treasury, and all federally insured 
banks, whether state or federally chartered, subject to the discipline imposed by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.162
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The Volcker I report found the old American approach to be so idiosyncratic as to mark 
the United States as the “exception” to the world’s financial regulatory approaches.163  As we 
explained in Part I, there is no question that the pre-crisis system evolved through path 
dependency and a reactive, crisis-driven, rather than systematic, approach to financial 
regulation.164   But that does not mean that it is without its attractions.  The system kept 
regulators on their toes through regulatory competition, and yet permitted regulators to act 
substantively, through litigation, formal rules-based regulation, and informal principles 
oversight.  Small patchwork fixes to this system, such as assuring some regulatory authority over 
credit default swaps, may be both politically feasible and appropriately cautious.165
In any event, the blueprint and Volcker reports are unusual in other respects.  The 
blueprint proposes the most radical reorganization of financial regulation since the Great 
Depression.  The Volcker reports are likewise bold.  How should we make sense of these?  The 
blueprint’s proposed reorganization is, we think, meant to pursue two broad themes, one 
procedural and one philosophical.  Both bear specific, mostly unstated, substantive implications, 
some of which are clear and immediate while others are inchoate and potential.  Contrasting 
implications flow from the Volcker proposals.  
First, procedurally, the blueprint embodies a new vision of the bureaucracy as a creature 
to be tamed and supervised by the President—and no one else.166  This means a consolidation of 
power in the federal government rather than states.  It involves reposing that power in the 
executive branch rather than in Congress.  The vision then concentrates that power in the office 
of the President and the cabinet secretaries removable by him or her at will, rather than 
distributing it through independent agencies like the SEC and the Fed.  After this amassing of 
power, the executive would delegate it, to the extent feasible, to self-regulatory organizations in 
the various industries.
The Volcker proposals, in contrast, while also contemplating a radical reorganization, 
seem to follow the more traditional approach of using independent federal agencies, which are in 
turn more responsive to Congress, rather than reposing extensive power in the President and 
executive branch.  The 2008 Volcker report calls for a “system in which those responsible for 
prudential regulation and supervision have a high degree of political and market independence,” 
and emphasize a “need to ensure the political and market independence of national regulatory 
authorities.”167  That would rule out giving plenary power to the President and his cabinet 
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appointees, as the blueprint contemplates (and, indeed, as the on-the-fly approach to the crisis of 
2008 reflected). 
The reason for the different approaches seems to lie, in part, in competing understandings 
of political pressures that can be brought to bear against regulators during financial crises.  While 
the Paulson blueprint centralizes the response to crises in politically accountable officials in the 
Treasury Department, the Volcker approach, consistent with a long line of scholarship 
suggesting that central banking is best done independently from the political process, prefers 
insulating decision makers as remotely as possible from such political accountability and 
pressure.168  Furthermore, the Volcker reports evince no or little enthusiasm for expanded use of 
self-regulatory organizations so exuberantly championed in the blueprint.
Second, philosophically, the blueprint would make this presidentially-controlled financial 
scheme into a deregulatory enterprise.  Despite consolidation of regulatory power in the federal 
government, the vision is to delegate much of that authority in turn to self-regulatory 
organizations.  This deregulatory impulse is also reflected in the blueprint’s strategic timing, 
issued at the onset of crisis whose widening a year later produced calls for greater regulation, 
making for a dialogue that required engaging with the blueprint as a baseline alternative.  The 
philosophy is manifested in a move from the relative clarity of administrative rules to a vaguer 
principles approach that is comparatively opaque and committed to discretion.
The blueprint’s philosophy entails heavier focus on minimums of safety and soundness 
for financial institutions, than on traditional investor or consumer protection that U.S. financial 
regulators are best known for.  This reflects a particular view of the purposes of financial 
regulation, concentrating on systemic stability—and American competitiveness—rather than 
constituent protection, with minimal standards of prudential oversight and business conduct or 
corporate disclosure.
The Volcker proposals also evince a preference for principles to rules and offer at least 
some gestures of a deregulatory nature, such as withdrawing the federal government from the 
mortgage finance business.  But the Volcker proposals recommend a more substantive regulatory 
philosophy than the Treasury blueprint.  They imagine specific substantive limits on institutional 
size and trading activities. They imagine specific regulation of financial products.  They imagine 
specific ways to regulate rating agency compensation and even weigh in on accounting debates 
and matters of corporate governance like board performance and executive compensation.    The 
role of independence for domestic regulators and global coordination for the Volcker group are 
hard to overstate.  Volcker emphasizes: markets have “become international in scope,” but this is 
not a reason to compete—instead “efforts to reregulate them” are best approached “on a 
coordinated basis.”169

168 The Volcker [2008] report explains: “as risks are materializing and extreme pressures mounting, it is even more 
challenging for supervisors not to overreact to the use of capital, reserve, and liquidity buffers that should have been 
built up for use in just such circumstances.  All this further underscores the importance of these agencies having . . . 
independence.”  VOLCKER I, supra note ___,  42. 
169 VOLCKER I, supra note ___, at 49. 
41 

Many implications follow from the striking similarities coupled with subtle differences 
between these two grand visions.  Although it may be possible, and desirable, to conduct a 
specific proposal-by-proposal dissection and selection between them, we think these broad 
procedural and philosophical differences provide a more productive general way to think about 
the approaches, to assess their competing implications, and to compare these with those of the 
prevailing approaches, before and since the 2008 crisis. 
Framed this way, two themes warrant the special attention supplied in the following 
framework and evaluation.  The first theme, which Section A explores, concerns a longstanding 
debate among administrative lawyers about what to make of the independent agencies that the 
blueprint would eliminate, in favor of executive branch control, followed by delegation to 
industry groups.  In this view, the independence of regulators is a problem that the financial 
crisis presents an opportunity to solve.  The Volcker approach, on the other hand, appears more 
likely to welcome regulatory independence, and appears less sure about the value of delegation 
to private industry.  The 2008 Volcker report contends that “the time has also come to move 
beyond moral suasion and enlightened market self interest” to create a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme.170
The second theme, which Section B explores, concerns a longstanding debate in 
regulatory theory about the relative merits of regulatory competition, which Paulson’s blueprint 
and Volcker reports both could reduce, versus regulatory monopoly, which they could create or 
increase.  The blueprint seems to embrace consolidation of US regulatory authority in large part 
to project US capital market competiveness onto a global stage where other nations likewise 
compete.  The Volcker reports suggest embracing such consolidation domestically with a further 
view to achieve similar consolidation at the global level.   The fragmented pre-crisis model 
rested significantly upon notions of regulatory competition and the on-the-fly quasi-concentrated 
model that now exists is a non-trivial challenge to those notions.
Finally, Section C considers political realities confronting both these visions.  To be 
sustainable, the Volcker vision requires the international community’s will and capacity to 
collaborate as expected.  Both visions depend on the assumption that domestic regulatory 
concentration is politically feasible and sustainable.   Neither prospect seems highly likely.  The 
upshot may be that the most probable, and possibly appealing, approach to financial regulation is 
remnants of the traditional fragmented model, as modified during 2008, plus incremental reforms 
taken from the otherwise grand visions laid out by Messrs. Paulson and Volcker.
 A. Administrative Law 
 As a matter of administrative law, Paulson and Volcker’s formal centralizing proposals 
for regulation roundly reject the old, disaggregated model; Paulson’s blueprint may vindicate 
those theorists who support presidential control over decision-making; and both raise some 
questions about the future of preemption in this vigorous and federalized area.  We consider the 
administrative law implications of the approaches to financial regulation by focusing on the 
blueprint.  The blueprint’s proposed reorganization both federalizes and centralizes financial 
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regulation is unusual in the degree of power concentrated within the executive branch of the 
federal government, to the point where the structure of financial regulation would change.  
Before, that regulation has been conducted by agencies that have always existed outside the 
executive branch—the SEC, CFTC, and, to some degree, the Fed.171  The President cannot fire 
the heads of these agencies absent cause (which in practice has meant that they are not fired at 
all), and the agencies are run by a balanced set of Republican and Democratic appointees.172
 But under the blueprint, these agencies would be replaced by new regulators with less 
obvious independence.  In the interim, financial policy would be set by an inter-agency working 
group chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and not subject to many of the usual constraints 
on bureaucratic power, such as open government, and even judicial review.173  Ultimately, 
moreover, the powers of the Treasury Department would grow under the new regime, as the 
PWG were folded into the new, Treasury-controlled regulators that would supersede the SEC 
and much of the Fed.  The President’s control over financial regulation would also grow.  
Treasury, of course, is in the heart of the executive branch, and led by secretaries who serve at 
the will of the president.  These officials can be, and often are, fired by the President.174
 The blueprint thus marks a move away from independence and towards executive branch 
control.  Executive control over agency decision-making is something that administrative 
lawyers have been thinking carefully about since Elena Kagan made the case for such control 
after serving in the Clinton White House for seven years.175 To Kagan, executive authority over 
administration in general is all for the best.  She approvingly concluded, in a well-known article, 
that a contemporary president should “treat[] the sphere of regulation as his own.”176
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 This means that he should “convert[] administrative activity into an extension of his own 
policy and political agenda.”177  In Kagan’s view, this can lead to “enhanced government” 
through “executive[] vigor.”178  She is not alone in her enthusiasm.  Steven Croley has concluded 
that the White House is and, it is argued, should be, a principle source of bureaucratic 
initiative.179  Other scholars believe that Presidential power “inevitably expands,” and that this is 
no bad thing.180  Skeptics exist, of course.  For example, Thomas Sargentich characterized the 
most awe-inspired and enthusiastic of the “presidentialists” as proponents of a “Presidential 
mystique.”181
 The Bush administration did much to prove the descriptive part of Kagan’s hypothesis 
accurate.  It did so in the war on terror in particular, under which essentially every government 
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agency, and many state and local ones too, were pressed into a quintessentially executive sort of 
service—and concomitantly within the ambit of executive supervision.182  Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermuele have concluded that the presidentialism of the war on terror has also 
characterized the prominence of the executive in responding to the financial crisis.183
 But until Treasury’s blueprint, no executive had proposed turning large, famous, and old 
independent agencies into executive branch subordinates before.  Nor has the coordination of the 
actions of financial regulators proceeded along quite so novel administrative processes.184
Moreover, the blueprint does more than just centralize power.  It also would extend regulatory 
supervision over any remaining investment banks, and perhaps even hedge funds.  It would move 
the federal government into the regulation of insurance carriers and extensively curtail enduring 
state roles in banking law. 
 In this, the Volcker approach is quite duplicative, and the urge to rationalize and 
nationalize is strong in both the Democratic and Republican versions of financial reform.  The 
difference in the centralization between the two approaches lies in the independence of the 
regulators to whom centralization would be entrusted; with Volcker, the independence of the 
regulator is particularly important, whereas with the Paulson blueprint, the idea is to consolidate 
regulatory power in the executive branch under Presidential control, which is pretty much where 
it resided after the on-the-fly responses to the crisis in both 2008 and 2009. 
 Finally, this federal centralization, especially in the blueprint but also in the Volcker 
proposals, raises federal preemption issues, because they represent the federalization of so much 
of our decentralized financial regulatory architecture.  This is especially true of the blueprint 
because, by creating so many new federal institutions, it raises the prospect that those institutions 
would preempt state regulation of finance, including banking, insurance, futures and securities, 
even if Congress does not provide for preemption in its reform bill. Similar consequences could 
follow from implementing changes that the Volcker proposals contemplate, and these could even 
easily reach into subjects such as corporate board performance and executive compensation that 
traditionally have been treated as part of state corporation law.  
The idea that federal law might preempt state law is unsurprising to anyone with a 
passing familiarity with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  But when, exactly, the 
federal government has preempted state law is lately an increasing preoccupation of the Supreme 
Court.  Congress does not always explicitly express its desire to preempt all state law in a sphere 
of federal regulation with clarity. This reticence puts courts in the difficult position of deciding 
whether the legislature silently intended to displace state rules, usually by enabling a federal 
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agency to regulate in the area.185  Because the objectives of this sort of federal statutory scheme 
might be frustrated by enforcement of state law, a court may also find the state law preempted.186
Agency-driven preemption cases arise in a variety of contexts, but often arise when 
federal consumer protection or safety standards conflict with state tort law.187  The Supreme 
Court has recently shown increasing willingness to conclude that federal law does preempt state 
tort law in these cases, particularly if a federal regulatory agency supports that stance.  There are, 
of course, exceptions, such as the recent decision in Wyeth Pharmaceuticals v. Levine, where the 
Court decided against state tort law preemption.188
Still, as Catherine Sharkey has noted, the Supreme Court almost always sides with the 
federal agency when the preemption of state law by federal regulation comes before it.189
Accordingly, there is a prospect that the new, central, and powerful institutions envisioned by the 
blueprint, and perhaps those required to implement the Volcker proposals, could see their ambit 
to require regulations that they would conclude should preempt state law—and that federal 
courts could agree with them.   
B.   Regulatory Theory
 Administrative law differences aside, it may be difficult to imagine consolidating into 
just a few federal agencies the traditional and varying functions performed by the Fed, other 
federal and state banking authorities, the various state insurance regulators and the SEC and 
CFTC. Admittedly, federal government agencies are both created and terminated from time to 
time and no agency’s permanent survival can be taken for granted.190 Yet such large-scale 
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reorganizations of numerous agencies simply have not happened in the administrative state, at 
least not since the Great Depression.191
 But assuming for the moment that the political will exists, what are the implications of a 
reorganization of financial regulation that extensively consolidates power in Washington—in 
banking, insurance, futures and securities certainly—and possibly, as some suggestions in the 
Volcker reports signal, for cognate fields as wide-ranging as corporation law?  How would the 
implications of the blueprint and the Volcker proposals differ from each other?  Finally, how 
would either compare to the traditional fragmented approach or the quasi-centralized approach as 
it exists after the Fed and Treasury’s on-the-fly reforms amid the 2008 crisis? 
As a matter of regulatory theory, proponents of the principles of experimentation and 
regulatory competition might not welcome the centralization of either the Paulson or Volcker 
proposals.   True, the prevailing US fragmentary system of financial regulation is, as we have 
explained, not a particularly coherent one.  But it also offers recognizable virtues.  Chief among 
these is the application of divided government to financial regulation.   
Believers in a Madisonian vision of divided government may be inclined to keep the 
financial regulatory system in the form closely resembling the current one (whether or not treated 
as modified by the 2008 crisis-response centralization).  Divided government slows down the 
ability of new visionaries (which may include Messrs. Paulson and Volcker) with a 
comprehensive approach to regulation to implement that vision.  And there are those who believe 
that this would be no bad thing, such as, for example, those persuaded by the Burkean 
advantages of making change difficult.192
Proponents of decentralized experimentalism, such as Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf, 
might have additional reasons to prefer the relative disunity of the current system, or something 
that looks like it.193  On this view, it is desirable that the CFTC and SEC oversee markets that do 
similar things, because it creates something of a market for law.  Dispersion of regulatory 
authority creates incentives for competing authorities to engage in experimentation.
Consolidation of regulatory authority would alter those incentives. It is not clear that 
experimentation could occur under a centralized financial regulator, even if that regulator 
delegated considerable standard-setting authority to private self-regulatory organizations, as 
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visions like the blueprint contemplate, and certainly seems unlikely under the centralization that 
the Volcker reports contemplate.  
 The optimal balance between state and federal regulation, and corresponding 
fragmentation or consolidation, is an issue in substantially all fields of financial regulation 
implicated in the blueprint and Volcker reports.  In banking, consider capital adequacy 
regulations, a fundamental tool intended to promote the safety and soundness of banks.  A global 
standard for this tool appears in the Basel II Capital Accord.194  In the United States, different 
regulators embraced the global standard in various measures.  The Federal Reserve, the FDIC, 
Treasury, and even the SEC each took tailored approaches to capital adequacy of the institutions 
they supervised.  Some adopted the tool slowly or in tranches or even made adoption of it by 
certain institutions voluntary.
A potentially appealing result of this fragmentation of authority is a palette of options for 
participants in financial markets.  It also promotes a close fit between regulatory expertise and 
the targeted firms.  Of course, there are also costs to this disharmony.  For example, there is 
reason to believe that the SEC’s adaptation of the Basel II Capital Accord from commercial 
banking to investment banking failed to appreciate the different capital structures and business 
operations of the two types of institutions.  In addition, the many federal and state banking 
regulators have made bank operation excessively highly paper-intensive task.  They have 
complicated the banking sector’s efforts to create common international supervisory standards. 
These costs may increase amid globalization.  Consider insurance. The fact that insurance 
supervision in the United States is managed by the 50 states has been one reason why efforts to 
harmonize insurance regulation internationally have gone much less far than parallel efforts to 
harmonize banking supervision standards and even securities regulation, especially in the area of 
accounting.195  Although insurance companies have not hesitated to expand operations widely 
and deeply around the globe, oversight of them has not followed.  Even if the regulatory dis-
census and gaps in insurance were deemed desirable, it results not from any conscious national 
decision but is a haphazard result of the fragmented National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners’ inability to coordinate internationally.
 Scholarly debate on federalism and regulatory theory has been particularly vibrant in the 
context of securities regulation and its cognate field of corporation law.  Since the days of Ralph 
Winter, scholars have found some value in the fragmented approach to regulation, especially in 
corporation law.196  To some, like Roberta Romano, fragmentation makes it possible for small, 
fee dependent regulators to be responsive—indeed more responsive—to the interests of the 
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regulated industry than would the federal government (and this is seen as desirable).197  To 
many, fragmentation can lead to a race to the regulatory top, where the best regulatory policies 
are forced to prove themselves in a 50 state market for law. 
 Opponents object that through regulatory rent-seeking198 or managerial power, the result 
becomes a race to the bottom.199   More agnostic are those scholars who doubt the efficacy of 
any such competition leading to any particular or predictable results.200  Despite longstanding 
debate over state competition in corporate law, including whether it is to the top or to the bottom, 
in recent years, that competition abated considerably.201  Delaware won, with some newfound 
competition for it from Washington replacing erstwhile state competitors. This occurs primarily 
when Congress uses or threatens to use federal securities regulation to enact laws that intrude 
into subjects traditionally seen to be within state corporation law, as with Sarbanes-Oxley.202
 Federal corporate regulation preempts state law, however, meaning the potential for 
federal monopoly that can result in inefficient laws.  To address that concern, proponents of state 
competition in corporate law adapted its insights to the federal securities regulation context.203
They propose devices to overcome that monopoly by creating avenues for regulatory competition 
among jurisdictions worldwide  Leading examples are to give securities issuers the choice of 
applicable laws;204 give stock exchanges where issuers list that choice;205 or offer “substituted 
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compliance” (also called mutual recognition), which lets foreign entities regulated comparably at 
home access securities markets abroad without regulation there.206 Although the desirability of 
such proposals can be questioned,207 there is less doubt about their feasibility given global stock 
market competition.208
  In fact, when United States capital markets were among the only places to raise large 
amounts of capital, US federal securities regulation may have been a functional monopoly.  But 
of late, stock exchange competition, and accompanying regulatory oversight, intensified amid 
globalization and technology changes.209  There are now dozens of vibrant capital markets in the 
world, all vying with each other to attract capital.  These markets and regulators compete with 
one another, breaking the erstwhile US federal monopoly.210  Choice of law devices may not 
even be necessary to enable national markets and related regulatory oversight to compete on a 
global basis.211
 The blueprint and Volcker reports respond to such global developments in different ways. 
True, both would take large strides towards ending the state role in financial regulation and 
substantially consolidate it in the federal government.  The blueprint explicitly contemplates 
doing so for traditional state insurance and banking, and maintaining and unifying federal 
regulatory authority over securities and futures.  Although not explicit, the blueprint’s logic even 
allows for consolidation of federal authority over state corporation law,212 and the Volcker 
reports refer to the need to increase corporate board governance generally, and especially in the 
areas of executive compensation and financial reporting.213  Both also raise the prospect of the 
preemption of state law in all these fields, something that federal regulators and courts, as we 
noted, have increasingly interpreted their statutory responsibilities to require.214
 To that extent, the blueprint and Volcker proposals may seem to promote federal 
regulatory monopoly that could result in inefficient laws.  But the grand visions part ways in 
their respective responses to globalization and resulting global regulatory competition.  The 
blueprint seeks to promote US capital market competitiveness, consolidating oversight in 
Washington but adopting a relatively loose supervisory approach with considerable delegation to 
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industry self-regulators.  This attempts to put US financial firms, and the US federal regulatory 
apparatus, in a favorable competitive position with other nations.  In effect, the blueprint first 
concentrates US financial regulation using a consolidated federal structure and then embraces 
global fragmentation among competing national structures participating in global competition.  
 These implications of the blueprint entail a re-conception of federalized financial 
regulation that would essentially reverse contending stances in regulatory theory debates.  
Proponents of federal financial regulation have urged it as an antidote to state law’s perceived 
laxity.  Opponents express concern about how resulting regulatory monopoly may yield 
inefficient laws.  But if the US federal regulatory monopoly in securities regulation is abating, 
and global regulatory competition intensifying, then risk of inefficient laws from US regulatory 
monopoly declines.  So the blueprint sides with those otherwise averse to federal regulatory 
monopoly by using it to embrace global regulatory competition and committing the US to 
succeed in it. 
 In contrast, the Volcker reports implicitly side with those favoring federal regulatory 
monopoly precisely to provide mandatory controls in financial regulation.  The Volcker vision is 
to make US capital markets sound and its real economy stable.  It consolidates oversight in 
Washington, using a substantive regulatory philosophy with limitations like caps on the size of 
financial institutions or businesses they can pursue.  It responds to globalization not by 
embracing competition but by seeking collaboration.  The quest for domestic concentration 
coupled with international collaboration addresses concern that, if the US federal regulatory 
monopoly abates, free global competition may spell lax regulation.  A global regulatory 
monopoly is sought.
C. Political Reality
 These normative distinctions between Paulson’s blueprint and the Volcker reports raise 
additional matters that turn more political and practical.  We are not sure that wholesale 
centralization is realistic, and so our assessments of the grand visions posit that they must 
contend with prospects for their sustainability.  For the Volcker approach, this requires attention 
to whether the envisioned global coordination among nations is feasible.  For both, it requires 
considering whether the envisioned domestic concentration is achievable and sustainable.  
Already, there is some support for turning any form of consolidated regulation into regulation by 
committee, where extant regulators coordinate approaches more carefully.  This “National 
Director of Intelligence” approach for financial markets appears to represent centralization more 
in name than in fact.  
 The Volcker vision sees extensive collaboration among national regulators in a large 
number of countries who will not only agree to share information but also coordinate on setting, 
maintaining and enforcing agreed regulations of financial markets.  Although there is some 
modest support for such a prospect in certain discrete contexts, such as the Basel Accords, and 
some progress evident in converging of international accounting standards, it is not obvious that 
the requisite coordination for broad financial regulation will occur or be sustainable.215
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 In times of economic crisis, such as during 2008, there may be greater willingness among 
nations to join together, even to sign cooperation agreements and join periodic communiqués, 
such as the G20 overture cited earlier.216 Yet crisis also can induce national leaders to 
concentrate more intensively on domestic affairs and interests,217 even among members of 
otherwise successful economic blocs, such as the European Union.218  It is difficult to predict 
international propensity toward regulatory cooperation during periods of economic expansion, 
particularly considering how the globalization of finance and related competition is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. 
 Cold comfort appears in various initiatives to develop bilateral and multi-lateral 
platforms to coordinate undertakings among financial regulators from different countries.219  A 
main example is the SEC’s developing mutual recognition program.220    Despite much fanfare, 
the SEC has formally entered into only one such agreement, with Australia, concerning only one 
such participant, brokers.  Furthermore, even the considerable SEC and international cooperation 
and convergence that has been achieved concerning international accounting standards is beset 
with hold-outs and disagreement.221  In part, this reflects extensive variation among nations in 
legal origins, and historical, political, sociological and economic orientations towards capital 
markets, securities investment, corporate governance and the roles of markets and the state in 
national affairs.222   
 The appetite for international coordination in financial market and regulation matters is 
constrained by inherent national interests to promote capital markets and financial industries 
domestically.223  There is ongoing and increasing regulatory competition among national 
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securities regulators, operating in part and indirectly through their stock exchanges.224  That 
competition is mediated, but only slightly, by efforts to harmonize regulation that IOSCO and 
entities like it have made.225
 Despite occasional signs of mild collusion among national regulators, this may simply 
reveal that it is necessary to engage with one another, and this often means competing to attract 
capital to their home markets.  These limitations may diminish prospects for the kind of 
regulatory collaborations that the Volcker plan would need and, without them, the Volcker 
vision’s stringent regulatory impositions could put the United States at a competitive 
disadvantage internationally. 226  That remains true despite occasional expressions of 
international unity, amid the 2008 crisis, when certain countries long deemed to be out of step 
with international financial regulatory norms got into step.227
 Unlike the Volcker vision, the Paulson vision essentially assumes that such international 
collaborations are unlikely to result in sustainable consensus.  Even so, both plans must confront 
domestic political realities, and practical limitations, on their shared visions for concentration of 
regulatory authority within the US.  Here, there is reason to doubt whether a truly concentrated 
regulatory structure, such as a two-peaks model, is sustainable in the United States.  The 
blueprint nearly acknowledges as much, despite proclaiming need for a “modern” regulatory 
structure to reflect “convergence of the financial services industry.”  In the same discussion of 
such perceived convergence, it explicitly recognizes different enterprise business models and 
different government interaction with enterprises.
 For example, the blueprint notes that “the requirements for financial capacity and 
managerial expertise should vary by type of financial product being sold.”228  It distinguishes 
consumer/retail transactions from business/wholesale transactions and distinguishes firms with 
government guarantees from those without them.   It recognizes differences between securities 
and futures firms, even though it recommends having them supervised by a single agency.   It 
distinguishes these firms from banks and insurers, which are also acknowledged to be different 
kinds of institutions. The customers of all these firms have different needs and related 
regulations probably should reflect them.  That means inherent fragmentation.  Nothing in the 
Volcker proposals counters these realities.  
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 Furthermore, the vaunted two-peaks model endorsed by both visions may not have 
proven its mettle.  These and other proponents invariably mention that numerous other nations 
have moved to the two-peaks model in the past decade, including the United Kingdom.  Yet the 
2008 crisis rocked the financial markets and many specific financial institutions in those 
countries at least as severely as in the United States.  This certainly gives reason to wonder 
whether any regulatory authority, no matter how centralized, ever could be in a position to 
become aware of excessively concentrated systemic risk. It does not mean there isn’t value to the 
structure or the quest, but experience does not demonstrate superiority of the two-peaks model 
compared to alternatives, including the battle-tested traditional fragmented US approach.     
 Accordingly, it is not clear the blueprint’s ordered coherence or the Volcker reports’ 
coherent ambitions will help their kind of centralization to triumph over contenders, including 
remnants of the traditional fragmented system as changed by the new model Fed’s on-the-fly 
responses to the 2008 crisis.  The on-the-fly approach appeared to reinvigorate the President’s 
Working Group; it is possible that political realities of transforming multiple regulators into a 
putative single regulator would stop at the regulation-by-committee form that the PWG 
resembles.229  Although the resulting quasi-concentration’s sustainability cannot be assured, its 
accomplishment attests to at least some staying power.  In any event, the de facto reform remains 
less sweeping than that imagined under either the Paulson or Volcker visions.
We believe that a superior resolution will be achieved by recognizing that many reforms 
in both the blueprint and Volcker proposals can proceed piecemeal.  Within the grand visions 
that each elaborate, appear a grab bag of discrete proposals that can be selectively adopted, 
following the traditional crisis-response approach to US financial regulation.  For example, 
Congress could accept the blueprint’s recommendation for a federal Mortgage Origination 
Commission and enact an optional federal insurance charter; following Volcker’s prescriptions, 
it could pass legislation to regulate credit default swaps and, by legislation or direction to the 
SEC, increase regulatory supervision of rating agencies.
We believe reforms such as these offer a more sensible and pragmatic response to the 
events we have catalogued. After all, what are the prospects for adoption of either of these grand 
visions or any of the discrete reforms that each contains?  Although we disclaim political 
scientific expertise, the content of reform post-crisis depends on a number of factors that turn a 
bit more on political economy than on law.  For example, although it raises the possibility of 
capture, recognized in public choice theory, industry support does help to overcome the status 
quo bias of both regulators and the legislature.230
We have seen some evidence of this, including a number of tacit bows to the coming 
regulatory expansion, ranging from apparent acquiescence of hedge funds to some degree of 
oversight, to the willingness of senior bank officials to accept bailout largesse—even at the cost 
of their own executive compensation.  One reason for crisis-generated reform may be consistent 
with another strand of public choice theory: it takes events of widespread consequence to 
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motivate poorly engaged and disaggregated majorities to re-examine institutionalized regulatory 
schemes, which between crises are likely to be responsive to more easily organized minorities.231
 Amid the 2008 crisis, political sensibilities undoubtedly galvanized and possibly shifted.  
The blueprint’s deregulatory posture, along with delegation, was offered essentially pre-crisis, 
when appetites had been building for several years, after Sarbanes-Oxley, for just such a 
deregulatory commitment.  Its origins are in a series of reports lamenting a decline in US capital 
market competiveness.232  It is a call to reform that, in that pre-crisis period, may have enjoyed 
considerable political traction, certainly among market devotees and perhaps commanding 
appeal across wide parts of the center of the political spectrum.    
 While market purists may yet prefer a blueprint type of approach that embraces global 
regulatory competition, more vocal advocates of regulation’s virtues, and a wide swath across 
the political center, may be prepared to embrace the more controlled regulatory vision set out in 
the Volcker reports.  Even so, when a triggering event inspires reform and even generates 
requisite political will to make change, the event and the reform are not always closely connected 
to each other, as Part I illustrated.233  These political and practical realities may point toward 
following America’s more traditional response to crisis of targeted incremental reform rather 
than pursuing the more sweeping visions offered by Paulson’s blueprint or the Volcker reports. 
 Still, those alternatives do appear to constitute the range of realistic possibilities and 
principal approaches ahead. We believe, as we have said, that incremental rather than 
revolutionary reform is the more prudent and pragmatic approach.   
CONCLUSION
Proposed reforms in light of the 2008 crisis are certainly sweeping.  The Paulson 
blueprint calls for the alteration or disbandment of federal governmental agencies that have been 
around for a century, and the Volcker plan echoes those calls.  The Fed was created in 1913 and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1933.234  The Federal government got involved with 
futures regulation with the 1922 Grain Futures Act, and established thrift oversight in the 1932 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act.235 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which formally delegated 
authority to establish insurance laws to states, dates to 1945.   Reform under either grand vision 
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would mean that these agencies and statutes be replaced, in whole or in part, with a new set of 
laws and financial regulators that would have very different responsibilities.   Under both 
Paulson and Volcker proposals, broad supervisory responsibilities would be consolidated in one 
or two senior federal regulators.
 To some, of course, financial reform, like much of corporate regulation, is not so 
important, and grand visions like these may be mere visions.236 When the Paulson blueprint was 
first mooted, moreover, some observers thought that its recommendations did not amount to 
much.  Economist Paul Krugman, a member of the Volcker report team, sniffed “To hide their 
lack of any actual ideas about what to do, managers sometimes make a big show of rearranging 
the boxes and lines that say who reports to whom.”237 The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board 
quipped that “No bureaucratic deck chair goes unmoved” under the plan, and otherwise exhibited 
little interest in its substance.238
 This sort of early dismissal, and the regulatory triviality argument more generally, is 
curious in light of what has happened since Treasury first mooted widespread reform. Since then, 
the United States federal government devoted some $500 billion to bailing out the financial 
system, which collapsed in a way that rendered investment banking as we knew it, extinct, 
drastically altered the structure of commercial banking and mortgage finance and caused severe 
hardship in the real economy.    
Despite early dismissal, since its release, the blueprint has garnered considerable, and as 
the crisis widened, escalated, attention.  The Volcker group’s reports, commanding equal 
interest, address some of the same territory directly.  One describes the blueprint as “far-
reaching,” and says that the “fact that Treasury has put these proposals on the public agenda, 
together with the seriousness of current conditions, suggests that there will be an active debate” 
on approaches to financial regulation.239
 The increasing focus on bold reform to concentrate regulatory authority should be taken 
seriously but cautiously.  After all, our evaluation suggests some enduring merits of the 
traditional US fragmented approach and the accomplishment of extensive reforms to it that 
significantly concentrated the structure of US financial regulation.  Additional concentration may 
not be necessary and may in any event prove unsustainable.   A grab bag of reform ideas appears 
in the otherwise grand visions for planned centralized reforms.  Adopting some of those would 
follow an American tradition of crisis response, using its traditional fragmented system.  In any 
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event, one of these three or four approaches to financial regulation seems destined to become the 
approach we take into the next crisis—and perhaps to pull us out of the current one.
